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I. INTRODUCTION 
Jim Judd, the outgoing head of the Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service (“CSIS”), has listed “the judicialization of intelligence” as one of 
the major changes affecting intelligence agencies. The judicialization of 
intelligence is a process in which intelligence agencies have to confront, 
often for the first time, “a range of legal issues such as disclosure, 
evidentiary standards, and the testimony of intelligence personnel in 
criminal prosecutions”.1 Mr. Judd made these remarks on April 15, 2008. 
In what is surely an admirable quality in the head of an intelligence 
agency, he accurately predicted the future. 
A month after Judd’s speech, the Supreme Court of Canada released 
its decision in the Omar Khadr case. Subject to subsequent national 
security confidentiality proceedings under section 38 of the Canada 
                                                                                                             
* Professor of Law and Prichard-Wilson Chair in Law and Public Policy, University of 
Toronto. I thank Anil Kapoor for helpful comments on an earlier draft.  
1 Remarks by Jim Judd, Director of CSIS, at the Global Futures Forum Conference in 
Vancouver, April 15, 2008, online: <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/nwsrm/spchs/spch15042008-eng.asp>. 
He added that such issues 
while not startling or novel issues for the legal or police communities, these do have 
significant potential implications and consequences for the conduct of intelligence 
operations. In some instances, they have also stimulated some interesting debates over the 
boundary lines between law enforcement agencies and intelligence services. 
He also noted a trend to increased transparency adding that “It is quite likely, I think, that the more 
information that goes into the public domain the greater will be the pressure to make even more 
known, in the process calling into question the legitimacy of secrecy.” For a somewhat more 
optimistic take on the role of courts and intelligence agencies, see Fred Manget, “Intelligence and 
the Rise of Judicial Intervention” in Loch Johnson, ed., Handbook of Intelligence Studies (Oxford: 
Routledge, 2007). Manget, a former Deputy General Counsel of the CIA, concludes (id., at 340):  
The involvement of the federal judiciary is limited but salatury in its effect on executive 
branch actions. Nothing concentrates the mind and dampens excess so wonderfully as the 
imminent prospect of explaining one’s action to a federal judge … Federal judges are the 
essential third part of the oversight system in the United States, matching requirements of 
the law to intelligence activities and watching the watchers. 
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Evidence Act,
2
 CSIS would have to disclose the fruits of its interviews 
with Omar Khadr at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba as well as the information 
that CSIS subsequently shared with American officials as a result of 
those interviews.
3
 The very next month, the Supreme Court released 
Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
4
 holding that CSIS 
breached its duties under section 12 of the Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service Act
5
 when it destroyed the operational notes of 
interviews it conducted with security certificate detainee Adil Charkaoui. 
Taken together, these two decisions highlighted that CSIS has constitutional 
and statutory duties to retain and disclose secret intelligence.  
A third decision, R. v. McNeil,
6
 decided by the Supreme Court in 
early 2009, also fits into the trend of CSIS being subject to increased 
disclosure obligations. Although this decision affirmed that not all 
government agencies will be subject to R. v. Stinchcombe
7
 disclosure 
obligations, it also held that an “investigating state authority”8 may be 
subject to Stinchcombe obligations to disclose the fruits of the 
investigation. This raises serious questions of whether CSIS will be held 
to be an investigating state authority when it investigates threats to 
national security and in particular terrorism. In any event, McNeil 
narrows the gap between CSIS being subject to Stinchcombe disclosure 
obligations and being subject to R. v. O’Connor9 third party production 
obligations by suggesting that the Crown has an obligation to bridge any 
gap by inquiring about known and relevant information held by another 
agency. Crowns will have to inquire whether CSIS has relevant 
information in most terrorism prosecutions.
10
 The gap was also narrowed 
by the Court’s ruling in McNeil that truly relevant information held by 
third parties will generally have to be disclosed absent successful claims 
of privilege.
11
 
Although Khadr and Charkaoui II were made outside of the criminal 
context, they, when combined with McNeil, have implications for the 
retention and disclosure of intelligence in terrorism prosecutions. For 
                                                                                                             
2 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5. 
3 Canada (Justice) v. Khadr, [2008] S.C.J. No. 28, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Khadr (S.C.C.)”]. 
4 [2008] S.C.J. No. 39, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Charkaoui II”]. 
5 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-23 [hereinafter “CSIS Act”]. 
6 [2009] S.C.J. No. 3, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 66 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “McNeil”]. 
7 [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Stinchcombe”]. 
8 McNeil, supra, note 6, at para. 14. 
9 [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “O’Connor”]. 
10 McNeil, supra, note 6, at paras. 47-51. 
11 Id., at para. 41. 
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example, CSIS’s destruction of intelligence in the Air India trial violated 
the accused’s rights12 under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms
13
 and the recently completed Khawaja terrorism 
prosecution featured extensive litigation over whether CSIS intelligence 
had to be disclosed to the accused.
14
 The Court in Charkaoui II 
significantly qualifies the traditional idea that CSIS is a security 
intelligence agency that should not be concerned with the collection of 
evidence or the evidentiary implications of its actions. Although CSIS 
was never intended to be and is not a police force, “the activities of the 
RCMP and those of CSIS have in some respects been converging as 
they, and the country, have become increasingly concerned about 
domestic and international terrorism.”15 Charkaoui II is a wake-up call 
that recognizes the need to interpret the CSIS Act enacted in 1984 in 
light of changed circumstances, as Canada has emerged from a Cold War 
era, in which intelligence could always be kept secret, into a post-Air 
India and September 11 era, in which intelligence investigations of 
suspected terrorists can quickly become matters in which arrests and 
subsequent legal proceedings are required.  
The obligations to retain and possibly to disclose intelligence 
imposed on CSIS are broader in Charkaoui II than they are in Khadr. 
The Court in Charkaoui II interprets section 12 of the CSIS Act, which 
applies to the collection, retention and analysis of all CSIS intelligence 
relating to security threats. The Court supports its interpretation of 
section 12 by reference to section 7 of the Charter, which it affirms 
applies to security certificate proceedings under immigration law because 
“the consequences of security certificates are often more severe than 
those of many criminal charges”.16 At the same time, however, the 
decision remains a general interpretation of section 12 of the CSIS Act as 
it applies to all of CSIS’s activities. 
The Court’s decision in Khadr is narrower than Charkaoui. The 
ambit of CSIS’s disclosure obligations in Khadr is framed not by section 
                                                                                                             
12 R. v. Malik, [2002] B.C.J. No. 3219 (B.C.S.C.); R. v. Malik, [2004] B.C.J. No. 842, 119 
C.R.R. (2d) 39 (B.C.S.C.). 
13 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
14 Canada (Attorney General) v. Khawaja, [2007] F.C.J. No. 648, [2008] 1 F.C.R. 621 
(F.C.); Canada (Attorney General) v. Khawaja, [2007] F.C.J. No. 1635, [2008] 4 F.C.R. 3 (F.C.A.); 
Canada (Attorney General) v. Khawaja, [2007] F.C.J. No. 622, [2008] 1 F.C.R. 547 (F.C.A.) 
[hereinafter “Khawaja I”]; Canada (Attorney General) v. Khawaja, [2008] F.C.J. No. 702 (F.C.). 
15 Charkaoui II, supra, note 4, at para. 26. 
16 Id., at para. 54. 
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12 of the CSIS Act or by Stinchcombe,
17
 but by the precise scope of the 
violation of international law that required extra-territorial application of 
the Charter. In this sense, the Court’s decision follows the restrictive 
approach to the extra-territorial application of the Charter in R. v. Hape.
18
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Khadr is also narrower than the Federal 
Court of Appeal’s appeal decision in the same case which applied broad 
Stinchcombe
19
 disclosure obligations. It will be suggested in this essay 
that the restrictive nature of the disclosure obligation in Khadr is 
regrettable because the Court could have defined the disclosure obligation 
more broadly while still allowing the government an opportunity to 
justify exceptions to it on the grounds that the information was not 
relevant to Omar Khadr’s defence or because of particular harms that 
disclosure would cause to national security, national defence or international 
relations. 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Khadr and Charkaoui II have the 
potential to subject CSIS’s secret intelligence to the rule of law, external 
verification and adversarial challenge in legal proceedings. The 
disclosure of CSIS intelligence provides a vehicle for the objects of 
intelligence (or security-cleared special advocates acting on their behalf) 
to challenge the accuracy and reliability of intelligence that would 
normally not see the light of day. The findings of the Arar Commission 
that the RCMP passed on inaccurate and unfair intelligence labelling 
Maher Arar and his wife as Islamic extremists associated with Al 
Qaeda
20
 underline the damage that inaccurate intelligence can cause to 
individuals in a world where intelligence can be transferred within and 
between governments with the click of a send button. The disclosure of 
intelligence can serve as another instrument of accountability for CSIS.  
Although the Court’s ruling about the importance of retention of 
intelligence in Charkaoui could have positive benefits in terms of 
increased adjudicative fairness and increased accountability for CSIS, it 
could also lead to increased retention of intelligence files and as such 
have negative impacts on privacy. If CSIS adjusts its practices to respond 
to the new imperatives of retention and disclosure of intelligence, it will 
be important that its review bodies remain vigilant that CSIS only collect 
                                                                                                             
17 Supra, note 7. 
18 [2007] S.C.J. No. 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hape”]. For my 
criticisms of Hape, see “Hape Creates Charter Free Zones” (2007) 53 Crim. L.Q. 1. 
19 Supra, note 7. 
20 Commission of Inquiry into the Activities of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher 
Arar, Analysis and Recommendations (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 2006), at 24-25. 
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intelligence to the extent that it is strictly necessary to fulfil its statutory 
mandate. It will also be important that review bodies have the ability to 
follow intelligence that CSIS may share with other agencies. 
Unfortunately, the Canadian government has still not responded to the 
recommendations made by the Arar Commission that were designed to 
strengthen the review of national security activities with special attention 
to increased information sharing and integration between the RCMP, 
CSIS and other agencies with national security responsibilities.
21
 
The Court’s decisions in Khadr and Charkaoui II should mean that 
more intelligence including “raw” intelligence in the form of original and 
operational notes and recordings should be retained by CSIS, but it does 
not necessarily mean that such intelligence will be disclosed in legal 
proceedings. In both cases, the Court stressed that disclosure would not 
be automatic and that the government would have an opportunity to 
justify non-disclosure on grounds related to the harms that disclosure 
would cause to national security. In Khadr, the government could seek 
non-disclosure orders under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act and 
the Federal Court judge would balance and reconcile the competing 
interests in disclosure and non-disclosure. In Charkaoui, the Court 
accepted that the judge would filter and summarize the intelligence that 
could be disclosed to the detainee on standards under the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act
22
 that are even more protective of state 
interests in secrecy than those under section 38 of the Canada Evidence 
Act because they prohibit the disclosure to the detainee and the public of 
all information that, if disclosed, would harm national security or 
persons. The Court’s caution in both cases about the actual disclosure of 
intelligence to the directly affected person is consistent with the Court’s 
caution in other cases about the dangers of disclosing intelligence 
especially given Canada’s position as a net importer of intelligence.23 
Courts will have to reject the overclaiming of secrecy if the promise of 
disclosure of intelligence offered in Khadr and Charkaoui is to be made 
real. 
                                                                                                             
21 Commission of Inquiry into the Activities of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher 
Arar, A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP’s National Security Activities (Ottawa: Supply and 
Services, 2006). 
22 S.C. 2001, c. 27. 
23 Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 73, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.); 
Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2002] [2007] 1 S.C.R. 
350 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Charkaoui I”]. 
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In order to appreciate the potential magnitude of the change that 
could be caused by Khadr and in particular Charkaoui, a little history is 
necessary. The second part of this paper will provide an overview of the 
evolution of Canadian approaches to secrecy and the use of intelligence 
as evidence. The changes in these areas have been rapid and profound. 
Until 1982, Ministers were able to assert an essentially unreviewable 
discretion to prevent the disclosure of intelligence on grounds of harms 
to national security. Although the Federal Court was given jurisdiction to 
order the disclosure of intelligence in 1982, it exercised this jurisdiction 
very cautiously in the last days of the Cold War, sometimes not even 
examining secret intelligence before ordering that it not be disclosed. 
In the post-September 11 environment, there are signs of change, 
including an increased skepticism to claims that the non-disclosure of 
intelligence is justified by concerns about the mosaic effect in which the 
disclosure of even innocuous intelligence can assist the enemy. There is 
also a recognition that while Canada remains a net importer of 
intelligence, it still can and should request foreign agencies to consent to 
the disclosure of intelligence. Other factors leading to increased attempts 
to obtain the disclosure of intelligence are increased use of security 
certificates under the immigration law as a form of anti-terrorism law 
and the broad new terrorism offences found in the Anti-Terrorism Act
24
 
which can make much intelligence relevant to the prosecution process. 
The third part of this paper will assess the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Khadr v. Canada with an emphasis on its holding about the disclosure 
of intelligence collected and disseminated by CSIS more than on its 
holding about the extra-territorial application of the Charter.
25
 That said, 
it will be seen that the topics are linked because the Court restricted the 
ambit of CSIS material subject to disclosure on the basis of its 
understanding of the scope of the conduct that violated international law 
and required an extra-territorial application of the Charter and a finding 
of a Charter violation. The disclosure obligations in Khadr were shaped 
by the limited scope of the Charter violation. They were not shaped by 
the concern in Stinchcombe that the accused should have access to all 
relevant and non-privileged material in order to assist in his or her 
defence. A broader definition of what had to be disclosed in Khadr 
would not have been determinative because the Court contemplated that 
                                                                                                             
24 S.C. 2001, c. 41. 
25 Benjamin Berger, “The Reach of Rights in the Security State: Some Reflections on 
Khadr v. Canada (Minister of Justice)” (2008) 56 C.R. (6th) 268 [hereinafter “Berger”]. 
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the government would be able to claim national security confidentiality 
and other privileges before any information was actually disclosed to 
Omar Khadr. Subsequent decisions about the ambit of actual disclosure 
in this case will also be briefly examined. 
The fourth part of the paper will focus on the Court’s decision in 
Charkaoui II with respect to the proper interpretation of section 12 of the 
CSIS Act as it relates to the retention of intelligence collected about 
individuals and groups. As will be seen, the Court’s interpretation of this 
provision was influenced by its interpretation of section 7 of the Charter 
and its preference that the Ministers who issue security certificates and 
the judges who review security certificates have all of the relevant 
information, including raw intelligence, available to them. This part of 
the decision was based on a healthy skepticism about relying simply on 
CSIS’s analysis and conclusions without verification against the raw 
intelligence. Indeed, the Court’s decision that the original intelligence 
should be retained was justified in large part on the basis that retention 
would allow CSIS, Ministers and eventually judges to verify the 
correctness of CSIS’s analysis and conclusions about the raw intelligence 
against the original data. The Court took notice of inaccurate intelligence 
in both the Maher Arar and Bhupinder Liddar
26
 cases and made five 
references to the need for verification of analysis against original 
intelligence in a relatively short 78-paragraph judgment.
27
 The possibility 
                                                                                                             
26 Mr. Liddar complained to the Security Intelligence Review Committee after being denied 
a security clearance necessary for a diplomatic posting.  
After reviewing the complaint, SIRC found there was no reasonable basis for that 
recommendation, and that it was inaccurate and misleading for several reasons. First, 
SIRC concluded that the denial brief contained an unfair and prejudicially inaccurate 
account of the information that the Service had in its possession when it began the 
security clearance investigation. Next, SIRC concluded that the brief was based on a field 
investigation conducted by an inexperienced CSIS investigator, who arrived at unfounded 
conclusions. SIRC found that there was no reliable evidence to support a conclusion that 
the complainant might engage in activities that would constitute a threat to the security of 
Canada, or that the complainant might disclose classified information in an unauthorized 
way. 
SIRC Annual Report 2005-2006, at 22-23, available online: <http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/anrran/ 
2005-2006/index-eng.html> [hereinafter “SIRC Annual Report”]. SIRC noted that the CSIS 
investigator was not able to provide it with the answer that Mr. Liddar gave at his security clearance 
interview and that this reflected “a long-running concern of the Review committee with respect to 
the CSIS practice of destroying the notes that the investigators take of security screening 
investigations”. As quoted in Charkaoui II, supra, note 4, at para. 40. SIRC recommended that 
“CSIS institute procedures to ensure that accurate notes are taken, or that a recording is made, of 
security screening interviews. These should be kept for five years after an interview, or for even 
longer periods should an interviewee challenge the outcome of a security screening investigation.” 
SIRC Annual Report, id., at 22. 
27 Charkaoui II, id., at paras 39, 56, 62, 63, 73. 
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of inaccurate intelligence conclusions and analysis was definitely on the 
Court’s mind when it concluded that CSIS must no longer destroy the 
raw intelligence it collects about individuals. 
Although the Court stressed the importance of retention and 
disclosure of intelligence for adjudicative fairness, its decision will not 
mean that security certificate detainees will have direct access to the 
intelligence if its disclosure would harm national security or endanger 
other persons. As in Khadr, intelligence would be filtered and 
summarized in order to protect national security interests before being 
disclosed to the detainee. In addition, unfiltered intelligence could be 
disclosed to the security-cleared special advocates who have been 
appointed in the wake of the Court’s decision in Charkaoui I holding that 
the complete lack of adversarial challenge to the intelligence used to 
support detention and possible deportation under a security certificate 
violated section 7 of the Charter.  
The fifth part of this paper will examine some possible harms and 
benefits of the judicialization of intelligence promoted by Khadr and 
Charkaoui II. I will argue that the judicialization of intelligence is 
generally a positive development that is part of an ongoing process of 
subjecting CSIS to the rule of law and subjecting its conclusions and 
analysis to validation and adversarial challenges that can expose errors, 
exaggerations and speculation in analytical conclusions. The retention of 
raw intelligence can increase CSIS’s internal and external accountability 
by creating the conditions under which its conclusions can be checked 
against its raw data. The retention of raw intelligence can also increase 
the adjudicative fairness of security certificate proceedings, terrorism 
prosecutions and challenges to the denial of security clearances by 
facilitating fuller adversarial challenge to the evidence provided by CSIS 
and others in such cases. Increased retention of raw intelligence can also 
make it easier for CSIS to work with law enforcement agencies. 
Although subsequent terrorism prosecutions will still involve section 38 
proceedings to determine whether intelligence must be disclosed to the 
accused, retention of intelligence can avoid findings that section 7 of the 
Charter has been violated by the destruction of relevant intelligence. That 
said, the immediate effect of Charkaoui II will be to inspire requests for 
remedies for the destruction of raw intelligence pursuant to long-standing 
but now invalid CSIS policies.  
The judicialization of intelligence is not without its dangers. It could 
lend a perhaps unwarranted legitimacy to the use of intelligence as 
evidence in the security certificate process. Intelligence, even intelligence 
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that is verified against the raw data, may still be speculative. Moreover, 
intelligence may still be erroneous if the raw data, data that may have 
been collected by a foreign agency, is itself erroneous or is shaped by 
confirmation bias or what a number of inquiries into miscarriages of 
justice have coined as “tunnel vision”.28 As will be seen, some leading 
intelligence practitioners and scholars are starting to recognize that 
intelligence collection and analysis may be distorted by a variety of 
cognitive biases including confirmation bias.
29
 Although retention and 
disclosure of raw intelligence provides some protection against tunnel 
vision, it does not guarantee that the raw intelligence itself will not be 
shaped and limited by the cognitive biases and limitations of the 
investigators. 
In addition, the promise of disclosure offered by Khadr and 
Charkaoui II might not be fulfilled if national security confidentiality can 
successfully be overclaimed by the government to prevent full disclosure 
or if special advocates who receive intelligence are unable to engage in 
consultations with detainees and others that may be necessary to provide 
effective adversarial challenge to the intelligence.
30
  
The Court in Charkaoui II only partially recognizes the potential 
effects of increased retention of intelligence on privacy. The Court 
concludes that the risks to privacy by retention of raw intelligence are 
justified when CSIS “targets a particular individual or group” as opposed 
to conducting investigations “of a general nature”.31 This distinction 
recognizes the demands of adjudicative fairness, but the Court may not 
have fully appreciated how many CSIS investigations target individuals 
or groups. The most recent public information about CSIS targeting 
practices suggests that over 90 per cent of the targets of CSIS 
                                                                                                             
28 On tunnel vision, see Fred Kaufman, Proceedings into the Proceedings Against Guy Paul 
Morin (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1998). On the general applicability of learning about miscarriages 
of justice in the field of terrorism, see Kent Roach & Gary Trotter, “Miscarriages of Justice in the 
War Against Terror” (2005) 109 Penn. State L. Rev. 967. 
29 Richard J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (New York: Nova Publishers, 
2006), at 28, 41, 59, 175 [hereinafter “Heuer”]. The author of this book worked for the CIA from 
1951 to 1979, retiring as the head of the methodology unit for the Director of Intelligence. Id., at 7. 
The book devotes five chapters to various forms of cognitive biases that can affect the analysis of 
intelligence including confirmation bias. It concludes that “significant biases in the evaluation of 
intelligence estimates are attributable to the nature of human mental processes, and not just to self-
interest and lack of objectivity, and that they are, therefore, exceedingly difficult to overcome.” Id., 
at 175. 
30 Craig Forcese & Lorne Waldman, “A Bismarckian Moment: Charkaoui and Bill C-3” 
(2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 355; Gus Van Harten, “Charkaoui and Secret Evidence” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. 
(2d) 251. 
31 Charkaoui II, supra, note 4, at para. 43. 
156 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
investigations are individuals or groups as opposed to issues or events.
32
 
If this continues to be the case, and there is no reason why CSIS should 
not focus on individuals and groups as opposed to issues and events, it 
will be very important that CSIS observes the limits of its statutory 
mandate when engaging in targeted investigations and that its review 
bodies remain vigilant to these limits.  
II. THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECRET INTELLIGENCE 
AND PUBLIC EVIDENCE FROM THE COLD WAR TO MASS TERRORISM 
Intelligence agencies have not traditionally had to worry about the 
disclosure of intelligence in legal proceedings. Intelligence was collected 
to be distributed within government to those with appropriate security 
clearances. Espionage and other prosecutions that might involve the 
disclosure of intelligence were possible but exceedingly rare. Until 1982, 
those who collected intelligence in Canada could be secure in the 
knowledge that the government could assert absolute secrecy claims to 
protect intelligence from disclosure. 
1. The Cold War and Absolute Secrecy 
In 1982, the Quebec Human Rights Commission attempted to 
challenge the invocation of national security privilege when investigating 
the reasons why a switchboard operator and a waitress had been 
dismissed for security reasons from their jobs working at the 1976 
Montreal Olympics. The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously 
dismissed the Commission’s challenge to the absolute national security 
provisions then in force under section 41(2) of the Federal Court Act.
33
 
The provision precluded judges from even examining material once a 
Minister of the Crown certified that the disclosure of the document 
would be injurious to international relations, national defence or security. 
The Commission’s arguments at the time were not without force. Its 
enabling statute clearly gave the Commission all the powers of a superior 
court and the common law in Britain had already moved away from an 
absolute understanding of national security confidentiality.
34
  
                                                                                                             
32 SIRC Annual Report, supra, note 26, Table 3, at 38. 
33 R.S.C. 1970, c. 10 (2nd Supp.). 
34 Conway v. Rimmer, [1968] A.C. 910 (H.L.). 
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Justice Chouinard for a unanimous Court upheld the absolute 
privilege on the basis that “saying that Parliament and the legislatures 
cannot make the privilege absolute amounts to a denial of parliamentary 
supremacy”.35 He also quickly dismissed a Canadian Bill of Rights 
challenge on the basis that while the absolute privilege “does of course 
create in favour of the Crown, the guardian of the nation’s higher 
interests, a regime which differs that applicable to individuals”,36 the 
result did not infringe the right of individuals to equality before the law. 
It is difficult to imagine a decision that was more the antithesis of the 
rule of law and accountability than this decision by the Supreme Court. 
Yet this decision was made only 27 years ago and in the year that the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was proclaimed in force. 
Although judges after 1982 were given the power to review secret 
information to determine whether it should be disclosed, old habits died 
hard. In 1984, the Federal Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the non-
disclosure of secret information that former RCMP officers claimed 
could provide them with a defence with respect to charges that they had 
stolen the Parti Québécois’ membership list. The Court of Appeal 
approved of the non-disclosure of information that it had not even 
examined, with Le Dain J.A. expressing doubts about the competence of 
the Court to determine the sufficiency and adequacy of restrictions on 
disclosure and Marceau J.A. stating that “to accept that national security 
and international relations be injured, even to only the slightest extent, in 
order that such a remote risk of extreme incredulity on the part of 12 
members of a jury be avoided, would appear to me, I say it with respect, 
totally unreasonable.”37 
A similar categorical if not cavalier approach to the preference of the 
state’s interests in protecting secrets over the accused’s interests was 
demonstrated the next year when those accused of terrorism were denied 
access to CSIS surveillance material on them despite the possibility that 
the surveillance could possibly have revealed exculpatory material such 
as the whereabouts of the Toronto-based accused who were accused of 
an attempted assassination of a Turkish official in Ottawa. Again, the 
Federal Court chose not to exercise its new powers to look at the secret 
documents. Justice Addy of the Federal Court refused to allow the 
Director of CSIS to be cross-examined on his affidavit and held that 
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the mere fact that Parliament has chosen to allow this court to consider 
an objection to disclosure on grounds of national security, national 
defence or international relations when the subject matter was 
previously within the exclusive realm of the executive arm of 
government, is not any indication that it is any way less important than 
before the statutory enactment.
38
  
In other cases, Addy J. expressed concerns that pursuant to the so-called 
mosaic effect, the disclosure of even innocuous information could harm 
national security and that great danger could be caused by the disclosure 
of any of CSIS’s methods, targets or members.39 The accused’s attempts 
to obtain disclosure was dismissed as “a fishing expedition” with the 
judge opining that the accused’s attempt to use intelligence material to 
impugn the credibility of a witness was “merely a side issue” in a 
criminal trial.
40
 The trial judge in this case eventually held that a fair trial 
was still possible in light of non-disclosure, but expressed considerable 
unease with the fact that only specially designated judges of the Federal 
Court could examine the information and no judge had in fact examined 
the secret information in this case.
41
 
2. Emerging Rights to Disclosure 
There were some decisions in the 1980s that demonstrated the 
possibility that intelligence might have to be disclosed in order to respect 
the Charter rights of the accused to disclosure and to make full answer 
and defence. For example, Watt J. held that disclosure was necessary in a 
case involving Talwinder Singh Parmar, widely believed to have been 
the mastermind of the 1985 Air India bombings that killed 331 people. 
He reasoned that even if the accused’s disclosure requests were the 
proverbial “fishing expedition”, they were now one that was conducted 
in “constitutionally protected waters”.42 In the wake of his ruling that a 
wiretap warrant could not be supported by material involving a 
confidential source that was not disclosed to the accused, the prosecution 
against Parmar and others alleging a conspiracy to commit acts of 
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terrorism in India was abandoned. Around the same time in the late 
1980s, the Federal Court of Appeal ordered that an affidavit used to 
obtain a wiretap under the CSIS Act should be disclosed to the accused. 
Once inaccuracies in the affidavit were revealed as a result of its 
disclosure, the then Director of CSIS Ted Finn resigned and another 
conspiracy to commit terrorism prosecution was abandoned.
43
 CSIS’s 
initial experience with court ordered disclosure was not a happy one. 
3. The Origins of the CSIS Act 
There was a tendency at the time that CSIS was created in 1984 to 
stress the differences between the collection of intelligence as opposed to 
evidence. This emphasis was related to the desire not to give the new 
civilian intelligence agency law enforcement powers. Although the 
McDonald Commission recognized that a security intelligence agency 
might have to work with law enforcement with respect to matters such as 
espionage, terrorism and subversion, it stressed “fundamental differences 
between most police work and security intelligence responsibilities … 
The main product of security intelligence work takes the form of advice 
to both government and regular police forces” consisting of “raw 
information” and “analysis”.44 The implicit assumption, so entrenched 
that it was not mentioned, was that intelligence would be secret. 
Other parts of the McDonald Commission also reflected Cold War 
assumptions. For example, it stated that “by far the most important” 
reason behind the “need to know” principle “is the need to minimize the 
damage of an unknown penetration by an enemy agent”.45 The 
McDonald Commission recognized that section 41 of the Federal Court 
Act allowed Ministers of the Crown to withhold information from the 
courts on the grounds that disclosure of the information would harm 
national security.
46
  
Much of the debate that followed the McDonald Commission’s 
report and led to the enactment of the CSIS Act in 1984 stressed 
differences between police and security intelligence work. One of the 
prime differences was that the work of the police would eventually 
become public and subject to challenge in court while the work of 
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security intelligence agencies would remain secret. The most frequently 
quoted passage in this regard was the following statement taken from a 
Special Senate Committee chaired by Michael Pitfield that reported in 
1983. The Pitfield Committee stated: 
Law enforcement is essentially reactive. While there is an element of 
information-gathering and prevention in law enforcement, on the whole 
it takes place after the commission of a distinct criminal offence. The 
protection of security relies less on reaction to events; it seeks advance 
warning of security threats, and is not necessarily concerned with 
breaches of the law. Considerable publicity accompanies and is an 
essential part of the enforcement of the law. Security intelligence work 
requires secrecy. Law enforcement is “result-oriented”, emphasizing 
apprehension and adjudication, and the players in the system — police, 
prosecutors, defence counsel, and the judiciary — operate with a high 
degree of autonomy. Security intelligence is, in contrast, “information-
oriented”. Participants have a much less clearly defined role, and 
direction and control within a hierarchical structure are vital. Finally, 
law enforcement is a virtually “closed” system with finite limits — 
commission, detection, apprehension, adjudication. Security intelligence 
operations are much more open-ended. The emphasis is on investigation, 
analysis, and the formulation of intelligence.
47
 
In this passage, a stark contrast was drawn between the reactive work of 
the police and the proactive work of security intelligence agencies. This 
discounted the crime prevention role of the police as well as their 
responsibility to enforce the law with respect to inchoate offences such 
as conspiracies and attempts. The Pitfield Committee ignored the 
overlapping jurisdiction of the police and security intelligence agencies 
with respect to terrorist plots that would be both threats to the security of 
Canada and crimes. The Committee also assumed that all of the work of 
the police would be made public and discounted the ability of the legal 
system to protect some intelligence from disclosure through devices such 
as public interest immunity and evidentiary privileges. At the same time, 
it also assumed that all security intelligence required secrecy. This 
assumption made some sense with respect to the counter-intelligence 
work of a security intelligence agency in the Cold War, but much less 
sense with respect to terrorist threats. 
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The CSIS Act itself also placed considerable emphasis on 
maintaining the secrecy of intelligence. Although it gave those denied 
security clearances the right to complain to the Security Intelligence 
Review Committee (“SIRC”), complainants do not have a right to be 
present during SIRC hearings
48
 and SIRC is bound by all the security 
requirements and secrecy oaths that apply to CSIS employees.
49
 The 
secrecy of spying is also acknowledged in section 18 of the CSIS Act. 
The section makes it an offence, subject to some exceptions, to disclose 
information obtained under the Act that could reveal the identity of 
confidential sources of information or employees engaged in covert 
operational activities. That said, section 19 of the CSIS Act contemplated 
from the start that intelligence could be relevant to police investigations 
and prosecutions and might have to be disclosed to that end. 
Nevertheless, section 19 provides CSIS with a discretion not to disclose 
such intelligence. To the extent that intelligence is used for preventive 
purposes, there was a reasonable expectation that it could remain secret 
forever and not have to be disclosed to directly affected people or the 
public in legal proceedings.  
4. Changing Approaches to Secrecy 
As discussed above, the emphasis on fair trial rights and disclosure 
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms exerted some 
pressure in the late 1980s towards the disclosure of intelligence. This 
pressure came in prosecutions launched in the wake of the 1985 
bombings of Air India, events that resulted in the deaths of 331 people in 
what was, before September 11, 2001, the most deadly act of aviation 
terrorism in history. Even after September 11, however, there were some 
who clung to Cold War era ideas that secrecy was an absolute value and 
that CSIS’s security intelligence mandate meant that it did not collect 
evidence or have to worry about the evidentiary effects of its practices 
including its frequent destruction of raw intelligence. In his 2003 John 
Tait memorial lecture, then CSIS Director Ward Elcock returned to many 
of the ideas expressed 20 years earlier by the Pitfield Committee when he 
stated:  
Law enforcement is generally reactive; it essentially takes place after 
the commission of a distinct criminal offence. Police officers are 
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results-oriented, in the sense that they seek prosecution of wrong doers. 
They work on a “closed” system of limits defined by the Criminal 
Code, other statutes and the courts. Within that framework, they often 
tend to operate in a highly decentralized mode. Police construct a chain 
of evidence that is gathered and used to support criminal convictions in 
trials where witnesses are legally obliged to testify. Trials are public 
events that receive considerable publicity. 
Security intelligence work is, by contrast, preventive and information-
oriented. At its best, it occurs before violent events occur, in order to 
equip police and other authorities to deal with them. Information is 
gathered from people who are not compelled by law to divulge it. 
Intelligence officers have a much less clearly defined role, which works 
best in a highly centralized management structure. They are interested 
in the linkages and associations of people who may never commit a 
criminal act — people who consort with others who may be a direct 
threat to the interests of the state. 
CSIS officers make no arrests, but call upon the police of jurisdiction if 
apprehension is required. Their work environment is an open-ended 
world of nuance and shades of meaning. Information is not collected as 
evidence at trial but as input to the decision-making centres of 
government. Management control is vital in this work so that individual 
investigators’ insights are frequently cross-checked by others, 
preventing personal bias from clouding the results. Finally, it is 
conducted in secret so that peoples’ identities and reputations are 
protected and in order to protect the policy options of the state. 
Because of its open-ended, subtle and confidential nature, security 
intelligence work requires a close and thorough system of control and 
accountability in which political responsibility plays a large part. 
The Special Senate Committee remarked in 1983 that security work 
requires a different background than police work ... one that is embodied 
in a new type of recruit with a different outlook and education, 
emphasizing analytical and assessment skills. Events that resulted in the 
creation of the CSIS Act and the Service also led the Committee to 
conclude that a civilian organization would best assure the necessary 
political control.
50
  
In this passage, the then Director of CSIS reiterated the stark dichotomy 
between reactive policing and proactive and secret intelligence that had 
been articulated 20 years earlier in the Pitfield Report. There was little, if 
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any, recognition that CSIS would have to change in response to its 
overlapping jurisdiction with the RCMP with respect to the activities of 
suspected terrorists that could also be crimes, including the many new 
crimes of facilitating and financing terrorism and participating in a 
terrorist organization that Canada created shortly after September 11.
51
 
The above approach with its emphasis on secrecy and the idea that 
CSIS does not collect evidence can be contrasted with that taken by Bob 
Rae in his 2005 review of the Air India bombing. Rae observed that at 
the time of the creation of CSIS in 1984 “counter-intelligence (as 
opposed to counter-terrorism) took up 80 per cent of the resources of 
CSIS. The Cold War was very much alive, and the world of counter-
intelligence and counter-espionage in the period after 1945 had created a 
culture of secrecy and only telling others on a ‘need to know’ basis 
deeply pervaded the new agency.” Rae commented on the dangers of 
excessive secrecy and a silo-based approach in which security 
intelligence and the police were reluctant to share information. 
Reflecting on CSIS’s destruction of wiretaps and original notes that were 
held by Josephson J. in the Air India trial to have violated the rights of 
the accused under section 7 of the Charter, Rae commented that: 
If an agency believes that its mission does not include law enforcement, 
it should hardly be surprising that its agents do not believe they are in 
the business of collecting evidence for use in a trial. But this misses the 
point that in an age where terrorism and its ancillary activities are 
clearly crimes, the surveillance of potentially violent behaviour may 
ultimately be connected to law enforcement. Similarly, police officers 
are inevitably implicated in the collecting of information and 
intelligence that relate to the commission of a violent crime in the 
furtherance of a terrorist objective.
52
  
Rae’s approach recognized that CSIS’s original attitudes towards secrecy 
were rooted in the Cold War and that a changed threat and legal 
environment meant that in some cases intelligence would have to be 
disclosed in legal proceedings or even used as evidence. 
The 1983 Pitfield Report was considered by the Supreme Court in 
Charkaoui II. The Supreme Court accurately noted that the Pitfield 
Report “stressed the distinction between the policing function and the 
role of an intelligence agency. Law enforcement agencies generally react 
to the commission of criminal offences, whereas those responsible for 
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prevention and for the protection of security must try to anticipate 
threatening events”.53 Significantly, however, the Court suggested that 
the stark dichotomy between security intelligence and policing made in 
the Pitfield Report and accepted by Noel J. in his ruling in Charkaoui II 
that CSIS was not subject to any disclosure duty because it was not a 
police force
54
 was no longer quite accurate. Justices LeBel and Fish 
stated:  
CSIS is not a police force. This is clear from the legislative history set 
out above. In reality, however, it must be acknowledged that the 
activities of the RCMP and those of CSIS have in some respects been 
converging as they, and the country, have become increasingly 
concerned about domestic and international terrorism. The division of 
work between CSIS and the RCMP in the investigation of terrorist 
activities is tending to become less clear…55 
This was an important recognition by the Supreme Court that both the 
threat and legal environment had significantly changed since 1983. In 
short, Canada had moved from the Cold War to an age in which security 
intelligence and the police must work together to prevent lethal acts of 
mass terrorism. In such an environment, CSIS can no longer afford to 
destroy intelligence in the name of secrecy.  
There are signs of increased recognition that a secrecy culture that 
may have been necessary to avoid penetration by the KGB during the 
Cold War may not be appropriate today. The Federal Court has 
abandoned its prior practices of not examining secret information. In a 
number of decisions it has expressed skepticism that reliance on the Cold 
War concept of the mosaic effect — namely, that the disclosure of 
innocuous information may still benefit the enemy — can in itself justify 
non-disclosure on national security grounds.
56
 The Federal Court has also 
recognized that while the third party rule still appropriately prevents the 
disclosure of information provided in confidence to Canada by foreign 
agencies that Canada should request the foreign agencies to consider 
providing their permission for the subsequent disclosure of information. 
The Court has also recognized that the third party rule should not be used 
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to prevent the disclosure of intelligence that is already in the public 
domain.
57
 Justice O’Connor has warned about the dangers of overclaiming 
secrecy because of its adverse effects on the fairness and transparency of 
proceedings, as well the credibility of the government’s attempt to protect 
secrets that must be protected.
58
 
In his 2008 John Tait Lecture, John Sims, the deputy Attorney 
General of Canada, reflected on the 1983 Pitfield dichotomy between the 
secret work of intelligence agencies and the public work of the police 
when he stated that 
the primary mandate for the new security intelligence agency was 
intended to be the provision of confidential “intelligence” to government 
decision-makers. This model remained workable so long as the 
objective was limited to the penetration and prevention of espionage 
and other long-term threats to the security of Canada. In retrospect, it is 
almost quaint to recall the UK’s traditional unwillingness to even 
acknowledge the existence of its security intelligence agencies.  
He went on to 
contrast this affinity for secrecy with the judicial system. The courts are 
traditionally grounded on principles of openness, transparency and 
public accountability. Fairness requires full disclosure of the case to be 
met, and public hearings before an independent, unbiased adjudicator. 
The rule of law, constitutionalism, and primacy of the rights of the 
individual are all salient features of this paradigm.
59
 
Intelligence agencies in the 21st century operate in a much more 
transparent manner than they did in the 1980s. For example, the British 
domestic security service, MI5, not only has a website, but the website 
recognizes that Security Service officers have testified in criminal 
trials involving terrorism and that, subject to valid claims of public 
interest immunity, intelligence may have to be disclosed in terrorism 
prosecutions.
60
 Mr. Sims’ comments, like those of the Supreme Court in 
Charkaoui II, reflect a growing appreciation that it is no longer realistic 
to imagine that security intelligence will never have to be disclosed in 
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legal proceedings, especially legal proceedings involving allegations of 
terrorism as opposed to espionage. Changes in Canada’s legal and threat 
environment mean that secret intelligence will increasingly also be 
evidence or other material that may have to be disclosed in legal 
proceedings that attempt to detain, deport or punish suspected terrorists. 
III. THE COURT’S DECISION IN KHADR  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Khadr is best known for its 
decision that the Charter applied to the activities of CSIS officers who 
interviewed Omar Khadr at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. My focus here will 
not be on the reasons why the Court held that the Charter had extra-
territorial application, but rather on the disclosure of intelligence 
collected by CSIS. As will be seen, however, the two issues are not 
easily separated because the ambit of disclosure was limited by the 
Court’s understanding of the nature of the Charter and international 
human rights breaches that required the extra-territorial application of the 
Charter. 
Omar Khadr was captured in Afghanistan when he was 15 years of 
age. He has been detained at Guantanamo Bay Cuba since October, 
2002. His legal status has changed with the various changes in the legal 
regime that governs those detained at the American military base, but 
Mr. Khadr now faces charges of murder, attempted murder conspiracy, 
support of terrorism and spying under the Military Commissions Act.
61
 If 
convicted, Khadr could face life imprisonment and could potentially 
have faced the death penalty but the American government has decided 
not to seek a death sentence. 
As explained in a recent decision finding that Khadr’s section 7 
rights had been violated by the Canadian government’s continued refusal 
to request his return to Canada, “the events surrounding Mr. Khadr’s 
arrest in July 2002 are disputed. Clearly, he was present during a gun-
battle near Khost, Afghanistan, during which a United States soldier was 
killed by a grenade. Mr. Khadr is alleged to have thrown the grenade. He 
maintains that he did not.”62 No allowance was made for Khadr’s youth 
and he was initially denied consular access at Guantanamo. CSIS agents 
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interviewed Khadr at Guantanamo while aware that he had been 
subjected to a so-called “frequent flier” program of sleep deprivation.63 
1. The Case for Broad Disclosure Rights 
Given the serious nature of the charges faced by Khadr, the harsh 
conditions of his confinement and the fragmentary and disputed nature of 
the evidence in his case, he had a strong case when he requested from the 
Canadian government full disclosure of all documents possessed by the 
Crown, including records of the interviews that Canadian officials 
conducted with Khadr at Guantanamo. Although the judge of first 
instance found that there was not enough of a causal connection between 
Canadian investigative actions and the American proceedings against 
Khadr, the Federal Court of Appeal reversed this decision and held that 
the Crown’s broad disclosure obligations under Stinchcombe applied in 
this case, subject to valid privilege or national security confidentiality 
claims that might be made by the Crown. 
Justice Desjardins stressed the breadth of disclosure and stated that 
[a] failure to disclose relevant information impedes an accused’s ability 
to make full answer and defence and creates the risk of an innocent 
person being convicted and imprisoned. As one of the principles of 
fundamental justice, the right to make full answer and defence has been 
entrenched in the section 7 protection of the right to life, liberty and 
security of the person.
64
  
The Federal Court of Appeal decided this case before the Supreme Court 
placed new restrictions on the extra-territorial application of the Charter 
in R. v. Hape.
65
 It concluded that Khadr could receive full disclosure 
without interfering with the sovereignty of the United States because it 
would be up to the Americans to decide if any of the evidence was 
admissible in their own proceedings and to devise their own discovery 
process. The Federal Court of Appeal also recognized that the Attorney 
General of Canada could claim national security confidentiality before 
any actual disclosure was made.
66
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The Supreme Court initially seemed to articulate a broad right to 
disclosure when it stated:  
Canada has an obligation under s. 7 to provide disclosure to Mr. Khadr 
to mitigate the effect of Canada’s participation by passing on the 
product of the interviews to U.S. authorities. It is not clear from the 
record before this Court if all portions of all of the interviews were 
given to U.S. authorities. If Mr. Khadr is given only partial disclosure 
of the interviews on the ground that only parts of the interviews were 
shared with U.S. authorities, it may be impossible for him to evaluate 
the significance of the parts of the interviews that are disclosed to him. 
For example, by analogy with Stinchcombe, disclosure of an inculpatory 
statement shared with the U.S. authorities might require disclosure of 
an exculpatory statement not shared to permit Mr. Khadr to know his 
jeopardy and prepare his defence. It would seem to follow that fairness 
requires disclosure of all records in any form of the interviews 
themselves — whether or not passed on to U.S. authorities — including 
any transcripts, recordings or summaries in Canada’s possession. For 
similar reasons, it would seem to follow that Mr. Khadr is entitled to 
disclosure of information given to U.S. authorities as a direct 
consequence of Canada’s having interviewed him.67 
In this passage, the Court seemed to endorse a broad approach to 
disclosure that borrows from its refusal in Stinchcombe to draw a 
distinction between the need to disclose inculpatory or exculpatory 
material. The Court in Stinchcombe
68
 recognized that what material was 
exculpatory could depend on the perspective of the participant and for 
that reason endorsed a broad rule that all relevant information be 
disclosed. The wisdom of this rule has been affirmed by subsequent work 
on tunnel vision and confirmation bias which suggests that investigators 
filter much of the information that they collect through cognitive biases 
that interpret evidence as consistent with the suspect’s guilt and resist 
classifying information as exculpatory. The Supreme Court was thus 
correct to suggest that even if only inculpatory material was shared with 
the United States, “fairness requires disclosure of all records in any form 
of the interviews themselves”.69 
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2. Limiting Disclosure to the Scope of the International Human 
Rights Breach 
Having suggested a rationale for broad disclosure patterned on 
Stinchcombe, the Court resiled from the principle that Stinchcombe 
would apply directly to CSIS even though such an approach had been 
endorsed by the Federal Court of Appeal. The Court reasoned that: 
Our holding is not based on applying Stinchcombe directly to these 
facts. Rather, as described above, the section 7 duty of disclosure to 
Mr. Khadr is triggered on the facts of this case by Canadian officials’ 
giving U.S. authorities access to interviews conducted at Guantanamo 
Bay with Mr. Khadr. As a result, the disclosure order we make is 
different in scope than the order of the Federal Court of Appeal. The 
appellants must disclose (i) all records in any form of the interviews 
conducted by Canadian officials with Mr. Khadr, and (ii) records of any 
information given to U.S. authorities as a direct consequence of 
Canada’s having interviewed him. This disclosure is subject to the 
balancing of national security and other considerations as required by 
ss. 38 ff. of the Canada Evidence Act.
70
  
The Court reiterated the idea that disclosure was limited to the two 
categories articulated above in a subsequent part of the decision.
71
 The 
rationale for this restrictive approach seems to be that only information 
derived from the interviews at Guantanamo would constitute a violation 
of international human rights law and the Charter that required extra-
territorial application of the Charter, something that has been seen as 
extraordinary after the Court’s decision in R. v. Hape.72 In this way, the 
Court’s restrictive approach to the extra-territorial effect of the Charter 
limited and narrowed disclosure rights and obligations under section 7 of 
the Charter. 
Although the scope of the disclosure requirements in Khadr were 
limited by the extent of the Charter violation, it is significant that the 
disclosure obligations applied to information that was collected for 
intelligence purposes. Justice Mosley addressed this issue in his 
subsequent decision by noting: 
Questions have arisen in these proceedings as to whether the visits had 
a law enforcement aspect, about which there is some dispute between 
the Attorney General and Mr. Khadr’s counsel. The former Deputy 
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Director of Operations for CSIS was cross-examined on the point in the 
course of earlier proceedings. From what I have seen, it appears clear 
that the interviews were not conducted for the purpose of assisting the 
US authorities with their case against Mr. Khadr or for building a case 
against him in Canada. I note that no law enforcement personnel were 
authorized to attend at that time. The information collected during the 
interviews was provided to the RCMP for intelligence purposes. 
However, it is equally clear that the US authorities were interested in 
having Canada consider whether Khadr could be prosecuted here and 
provided details about the evidence against him to Canadian officials 
for that purpose. Nonetheless, the interviews by Canadian officials 
were conducted for intelligence collection and not evidence gathering.
73
 
The Court’s ruling in this respect affirms the principle that intelligence 
may be subject to disclosure even if the intelligence was not collected for 
law enforcement purposes. This should dispel any residual ideas in CSIS 
that the organization is exempt from disclosure obligations because it 
does not have a statutory mandate to collect evidence. That said, 
disclosure of intelligence is far from automatic and CSIS will have an 
ability under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act to obtain non-
disclosure orders. One discipline on the breadth of the non-disclosure 
orders in criminal cases, namely, the ability of the trial judge to stay 
proceedings or order other remedies to the extent that the accused’s right 
to a fair trial is infringed,
74
 will not be present in Omar Khadr’s case if he 
is not subject to trial in Canada. 
3. Subsequent Proceedings Reveal the Truncated Disclosure 
Obligation 
In subsequent proceedings in the Federal Court to determine the 
exact extent of disclosure, Mosley J. recognized that there was some 
ambiguity in the Supreme Court’s approach to disclosure. He stated that 
“at first impression”, the Court’s reference to the Stinchcombe principle 
of disclosing all relevant information without regard to what was actually 
passed on to American authorities “would appear to leave open the 
possibility that the designated judge could apply a Stinchcombe 
relevance test to the redacted documents in the collection”.75 However, 
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he ultimately held that the disclosure obligation was limited to the two 
categories of records of the interviews of Khadr by Canadian officials 
and records of any information given to the Americans as a direct 
consequence of the Canadian interview. Thus, Mosley J. concluded that 
“the field of inquiry conducted by this Court has been considerably 
narrowed” and did not include “information in the collection which may 
have been considered relevant to the criminal charges under 
Stinchcombe” that had been “provided by U.S. agencies for intelligence 
and law enforcement purposes unrelated to the visits by Canadian 
officials to Guantanamo”.76  
The result of this narrowing exercise was that only five of 186 pages 
of interview notes and witness statements fell within the Supreme 
Court’s order even though all 186 pages would be relevant under 
Stinchcombe disclosure principles.
77
 Thus the limited ambit of the extra-
territorial application of the Charter established the limits for the 
disclosure. Stinchcombe relevant material that was unrelated to the 
Guantanamo interviews was not subject to disclosure even though such 
material was shared with the Americans and might have been relevant 
and useful to Omar Khadr in his defence. 
Although Mosley J.’s subsequent ruling on the scope of the 
disclosure is based on an accurate and careful reading of the Court’s 
judgment, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the result is to 
undercut the idea that fairness required broad disclosure to enable Khadr 
to better prepare his defence. Causation principles have limited the 
disclosure requirement because the disclosure requirement only applies 
to information about Khadr shared with the Americans “as a direct 
consequence of Canada’s having interviewed him”. This restrictive 
approach discounts Khadr’s interests in knowing all the information that 
Canada shared with the United States in order to better defend itself. To 
be sure, such information should not be disclosed if it was not relevant to 
the charges faced by Khadr or was subject to a valid privilege claim. 
These are matters that Mosley J. could have determined by reviewing the 
file with the help of arguments from the Attorney General of Canada and 
the security-cleared special counsel. Nevertheless, Mosley J. found that 
such a review of the whole file was not necessary because the Supreme 
Court had categorically limited the ambit of disclosure by requiring that 
the disclosure obligations would be limited to information obtained from 
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the interviews or shared with the Americans as a result of the interviews 
and no more. In short, disclosure was limited to reflect the extent of the 
Charter and international human rights violation that required extra-
territorial application of the Charter. 
4. The Workability of Broader Disclosure Requirements 
The restrictive nature of the Court’s disclosure obligations in Khadr 
discounts the work that relevance and privilege could do in ensuring that 
Khadr only gained access to CSIS information that would be relevant to 
his defence and would not be excessively damaging to Canada’s national 
security and international relations interests. For example, information 
that CSIS shared with the Americans about the activities of the Khadr 
family after Omar Khadr’s capture and detention would arguably not be 
relevant to his defence of the charges that he faced in American 
proceedings. Such a finding would have protected any ongoing 
investigations into other members of the Khadr family.  
Most of the attention in cases and commentary has been paid to the 
breadth of Stinchcombe disclosure obligations, but there are limits to 
these obligations. For example, in 1995 the Supreme Court ruled that an 
accused could not have access under Stinchcombe to wiretaps that may 
have involved the accused on unrelated charges.
78
 In the follow-up 
proceedings from the Supreme Court’s decision in Khadr, Mosley J. 
recognized limits to Stinchcombe when he stated:  
It must be stressed that much of the redacted information in the 
documents produced to the Court does not relate to the applicant and 
would not assist him in defending himself against the criminal charges 
at Guantánamo. A considerable amount of this information refers to 
investigations concerning other persons unrelated to the applicant. This 
information would be irrelevant under the Stinchcombe standard.
79
  
Even if information shared with the Americans but unrelated to the 
Canadian interviews at Guantanamo had satisfied Stinchcombe 
requirements of relevance, the Attorney General of Canada would still 
have the opportunity to claim national security confidentiality privilege 
over such documents. The dominant test under section 38 is one that 
generally defers to the Attorney General’s claims that the disclosure of 
information would harm national security or international relations and 
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requires the applicant to demonstrate that the harms of non-disclosure 
clearly outweigh the harms of disclosure.
80
 Indeed, the Supreme Court in 
the Khadr case recognized the important safeguard that section 38 
provides to the government of Canada to prevent disclosure of otherwise 
secret material with respect to the more limited category of material that 
was directly related to the Guantanamo interviews when it stated:  
it is not possible on the record before this Court to determine what 
specific records should be disclosed to Mr. Khadr. In order to assess 
what specific documents must be disclosed as falling within the group 
of documents described in para. 37, a designated judge of the Federal 
Court must review the documents. The designated judge will also 
consider any privilege or public interest immunity claim that is raised, 
including any claim under ss. 38 ff. of the Canada Evidence Act.
81
  
As noted above, the Federal Court of Appeal had applied the broader 
Stinchcombe standard of disclosure, but also had reserved the ability of 
the government to justify selective non-disclosure under section 38 of the 
Canada Evidence Act or other privileges.
82
 
In subsequent proceedings in this case, Mosley J. applied section 38 
of the Canada Evidence Act, which allows a designated judge to balance 
the competing interests in disclosure and non-disclosure of the 
information and concluded that the appropriate balance would require 
some editing of the videotapes of the interview of Khadr by Canadian 
officials at Guantanamo. The editing would prevent disclosure of the 
facial images of the Canadian officials and the disclosure of certain 
sensitive information that was not revealed in the public judgment. 
Justice Mosley concluded: 
I am satisfied that disclosure of the sensitive audio content and the 
facial images would cause injury to Canada’s national interests and that 
there is no public interest in the disclosure of this information that 
outweighs the interest in non-disclosure. I have been advised that the 
DVDs could be edited to remove the audio containing the sensitive 
information and the identities of the officials/agents could be obscured. 
With those measures taken, any potential injury that might result from 
release of the tapes to Mr. Khadr’s defence team would be mitigated.83 
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Similar measures could presumably have been taken if the Court had 
applied full Stinchcombe disclosure obligations. 
5. Disclosure Only for Citizens? 
One final restriction on the disclosure obligations articulated in 
Khadr is that they seem to be restricted to Canadian citizens even though 
section 7 of the Charter and Stinchcombe include non-citizens.
84
 The 
reference to Khadr’s citizenship was made by the Federal Court of 
Appeal
85
 in its ruling in the case which, as discussed above, held that 
Stinchcombe would apply and was made before the Supreme Court 
restricted the extra-territorial application of the Charter in Hape. In a 
subsequent decision about two other detainees held at Guantanamo and 
alleged to have been interviewed by CSIS and RCMP officials in 2003 
and 2004, the Federal Court has distinguished the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Khadr on the basis that the applicants were not Canadian 
citizens. Justice Blanchard concluded “the Court is not prepared to 
extend the Charter’s reach beyond that which has already been decided. 
The Applicants are not Canadian citizens. They have failed to establish 
the required connection to Canada. Consequently their circumstances 
cannot engage a section 7 Charter right.”86 This is another example of 
disclosure rights being limited by the extent of the Charter’s extra-
territorial application. 
6. The Tensions Between Khadr and Stinchcombe and Singh 
Although the Court’s decision in Khadr has resulted in some 
disclosure of intelligence to Omar Khadr, it is limited by the restrictions 
that the Court placed in Hape
87
 on the extra-territorial application of the 
Charter. Indeed, the Hape-inspired limitations in Khadr have created 
tensions with two landmarks in earlier section 7 jurisprudence: Singh
88
 
and Stinchcombe.
89
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Khadr is in tension with Stinchcombe because the disclosure 
obligations in the former case are much narrower than Stinchcombe’s 
requirement that all relevant and non-privileged material be disclosed to 
the accused. The Court in Khadr does not reject the application of 
Stinchcombe on the basis that the proceedings that Omar Khadr faces in 
the United States are not criminal or will not result in severe 
consequences for Mr. Khadr. Such an approach would run counter to the 
Court’s recognition in other cases including Charkaoui II90 that section 7 
is not limited to criminal proceedings and that some administrative 
proceedings in the anti-terrorism realm may have more severe 
consequences than criminal proceedings. Indeed, the likelihood that 
Khadr will not be subject to an ordinary criminal prosecution with its 
traditional safeguards makes the need for disclosure even more 
compelling. 
The court rejects Stinchcombe disclosure rights in Khadr because it 
sees disclosure not as a right but as a remedy that is limited and defined 
by the extent of a Charter and international human rights violation that 
requires the extraordinary extra-territorial application of the Charter. As 
suggested above, such restrictions on disclosure can only be explained 
with reference to Hape. Moreover, they are unfortunate and unnecessary 
because the Stinchcombe limits of relevance and privilege would have 
given the government an ample opportunity to justify selective non-
disclosure of material to Khadr.  
By introducing the novel concept that section 7 rights are enjoyed 
only by Canadian citizens, Khadr also stands in tension to a long line of 
section 7 decisions starting with Singh which stress that section 7 rights 
are enjoyed by everyone and not just by Canadian citizens. Here again 
the only likely explanation for this doctrinal innovation seems to found 
in the Hape-inspired idea that courts must be cautious and restrictive in 
applying the Charter in an extra-territorial manner. The result may be 
that only Canadian citizens can claim the benefits of the extraordinary 
extra-territorial application of the Charter. Even accepting the need to 
establish some nexus to Canada, the citizenship category is a blunt and at 
times arbitrary one. A permanent resident may in some cases have a 
closer nexus to Canada than a citizen. In any event, limiting disclosure to 
citizens is in tension to the reference to everyone in section 7 of the 
Charter and the Charter’s relatively sparing use of citizenship as a 
category that defines the ambit of Charter rights. 
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In the end, Khadr is something of a hollow victory for disclosure and 
section 7 of the Charter because it limits the scope of section 7 rights and 
of disclosure through its Hape-inspired understanding of the 
extraordinary nature of extra-territorial application of the Charter. Khadr 
limits key section 7 concepts of broad disclosure rights and universal 
personhood even while it finds that section 7 has been violated and CSIS 
intelligence should be disclosed given the particular and limited 
circumstances in which CSIS participated in a violation of Omar Khadr’s 
rights under international human rights law and the Charter. The message 
to CSIS seems to be that intelligence obtained abroad may have to be 
disclosed, but only to the extent that CSIS violates international human 
rights in a manner that requires the extra-territorial application of the 
Charter. The message to Omar Khadr is that the Court recognizes that his 
Charter rights were violated by CSIS participation in an international 
human rights violation, but that he will only receive disclosure of 
information that can be causally connected to the violation. Moreover, 
the government can still oppose such limited disclosure for reasons of 
national security confidentiality.  
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION IN CHARKAOUI V. CANADA 
The issue in Charkaoui was whether a person subject to a security 
certificate had a right to obtain notes of interviews conducted with him 
by CSIS in 2002. Adil Charkaoui was told that disclosure was impossible 
because the original notes had been destroyed pursuant to CSIS policy 
once the CSIS officers had completed their analytical reports. Mr. 
Charkaoui argued that he was entitled to the notes and a stay of 
proceedings or release as an appropriate remedy. He also asked that new 
evidence introduced by the Minister in 2005 be excluded. He received 
none of these remedies from the courts, but the Supreme Court did affirm 
that CSIS had a statutory and constitutional duty to retain and disclose 
the notes of their interviews with him. 
1. The Trial Judgment 
Justice Noël of the Federal Court rejected Charkaoui’s argument that 
his rights had been violated and that he was entitled to a remedy under 
the Charter. His judgment stressed that security certificates were not 
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criminal proceedings and that CSIS was not a police agency subject to 
disclosure obligations. He concluded that there was 
no breach of procedural fairness as defined in section 7 of the Charter, 
the facts and allegations in the present proceeding not being based on 
these summaries. Nor, for the same reasons, is it necessary to discuss 
the role of CSIS in the investigation, other than to say that CSIS is not a 
police agency and that it is not its role to lay charges. As such, it cannot 
be subject to the same obligations as those attributed to a police force. 
Moreover, we are dealing here with immigration law, not the criminal 
law. The standpoint is different: see Blencoe v. British Columbia 
(Human Rights Commission), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307, at para. 88, in 
which Mr. Justice Bastarache, on behalf of the majority, states: “This 
Court has often cautioned against the direct application of criminal 
justice standards in the administrative law area. We should not blur 
concepts which under our Charter are clearly distinct.” See also 
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Chiarelli, [1992] 
1 S.C.R. 711; R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309.
91
 
Justice Noël’s 2005 decision was consistent with the idea articulated by 
the Pitfield Committee and discussed in the first part of this paper that 
stressed the distinctions between proactive and secret security 
intelligence and reactive and public policing. It also seemed to rely on 
the Court’s 1992 decision in Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration) v. Chiarelli
92
 for the proposition that the security certificate 
process was consistent with the Charter even if it did not allow any 
adversarial challenge to the intelligence that the Ministers submitted in 
secret ex parte hearings to justify the issuance of the security certificate. 
This idea was rejected by the Supreme Court in its first Charkaoui 
decision in 2007.
93
 
2. The Supreme Court’s Recognition of CSIS’s Evolving Role  
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous judgment by LeBel and Fish JJ., 
allowed Charkaoui’s appeal and held that subject to editing by the 
reviewing judge, Charkaoui should have access to the original interview 
notes. The Court took a much more nuanced approach to the stark 
contrast between policing and security intelligence work than that taken 
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in 1983 by the Pitfield Committee or by Noël J. in the decision that was 
the subject of the appeal. For example, the Court stated: 
Indeed, CSIS is not a police force. This is clear from the legislative 
history set out above. In reality, however, it must be acknowledged that 
the activities of the RCMP and those of CSIS have in some respects 
been converging as they, and the country, have become increasingly 
concerned about domestic and international terrorism. The division of 
work between CSIS and the RCMP in the investigation of terrorist 
activities is tending to become less clear than the authors of the reports 
discussed above seem to have originally envisioned. 
. . . . . 
In this light, we would qualify the finding of the Federal Court that 
CSIS cannot be subject to the same duties as a police force on the basis 
that their roles in respect of public safety are, in theory, diametrically 
opposed. The reality is different and some qualification is necessary.
94
 
The Court, through reference to the Arar Commission Report, took 
judicial notice of the changed circumstances in which CSIS operates 
especially since the events of September 11. In this context, it is no 
longer realistic or practical for CSIS to rely on the idea that intelligence 
must always remain secret or that it does not collect evidence. Although 
the jurisdictions of CSIS and the RCMP have from the start overlapped 
at least with respect to terrorist conspiracies, the enactment of many new 
terrorism offences in the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act has increased the 
degree of overlap.  
3. CSIS’s Policy to Destroy Raw Intelligence 
The Court considered a CSIS policy that required the destruction of 
operational notes. The rationale for the policy was the confidential nature 
of intelligence operations and the harm to national interests and affected 
persons that could be caused by the disclosure of intelligence. The only 
exception in the CSIS policy to the destruction policy was when 
retention of the original information was necessary because information 
such as a sketch or diagram could not be transcribed into an analytical 
report and when the information “may be crucial to the investigation of 
an unlawful act of a serious nature and employees may require their 
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notes to refresh their memories prior to recounting the facts of an 
event”.95  
The CSIS policy was first adopted in December 1994 and had been 
subject to only minor changes since that time.
96
 The CSIS policy was 
consistent with a Cold War mentality that valued secrecy above almost 
all other competing values. Although the policy made some allowance 
for the possibility that CSIS officers might have to testify in some serious 
terrorism prosecutions, it did not contemplate that CSIS officers would 
have to testify and present their work product in security certificate 
proceedings.  
4. Section 12 of the CSIS Act 
The Court found that the CSIS policy was based on an erroneous 
reading of section 12 of the CSIS Act. Section 12 is a critical component 
of the CSIS Act, but one that has received little if any judicial scrutiny. It 
provides: 
The Service shall collect, by investigation or otherwise, to the extent 
that it is strictly necessary, and analyse and retain information and 
intelligence respecting activities that may on reasonable grounds be 
suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada and, in 
relation thereto, shall report to and advise the Government of Canada. 
Section 12 restricts collection of intelligence by CSIS by requiring that 
the investigation relate to “activities that may on reasonable grounds be 
suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada” as defined in 
section 2 of the CSIS Act. Even where such a reasonable suspicion 
exists, section 12 places a further restraint that CSIS only collect 
information “to the extent that it is strictly necessary”. The reference to 
strictly necessary in section 12 follows recommendations made by the 
McDonald Commission that a civilian security intelligence agency 
should respect principles of proportionality in the collection of 
intelligence so as to avoid the excesses of the RCMP’s Security Service, 
which collected intelligence about opposition political parties and other 
forms of legitimate and lawful dissent in a democracy.  
Although the “strictly necessary” qualifier seems in both a  
grammatical and purposive sense to qualify the reference in section 12 to 
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the collection of intelligence and not its subsequent retention or analysis, 
there was some ambiguity about the proper interpretation of section 12. 
For example, CSIS’s policy requiring the destruction of operational notes 
except in very limited cases might have been supported by arguments 
that the retention as well as the collection of intelligence should be 
limited by the “strictly necessary” qualification. The Supreme Court 
decisively rejected this argument in Charkaoui II by stating: 
Nothing in this provision requires CSIS to destroy the information it 
collects. Rather, in our view, s. 12 of the CSIS Act demands that it 
retain its operational notes. To paraphrase s. 12, CSIS must acquire 
information to the extent that it is strictly necessary in order to carry out 
its mandate, and must then analyse and retain relevant information and 
intelligence. In short, OPS-217 rests on an erroneous interpretation of 
s. 12.
97
 
The Court then proceeded to give a number of purposive or functional 
justifications for its interpretation of section 12 of the CSIS Act as 
requiring the retention of properly collected information. One 
justification was the need for precision and accuracy in intelligence as 
stressed by the Arar Commission in connection with its findings that 
inaccurate intelligence about Maher Arar and his wife had been shared 
with the Americans. Justices LeBel and Fish stated that: 
The original operational notes will be a better source of information, 
and of evidence, when they are submitted to the ministers responsible 
for issuing a security certificate and to the designated judge who will 
determine whether the certificate is reasonable. Retention of the notes 
will make it easier to verify the disclosed summaries and information 
based on those notes. Similarly, it is important that CSIS officers retain 
access to their operational notes (drafts, diagrams, recordings, 
photographs) in order to refresh their memories should they have to 
testify in a proceeding to determine whether a security certificate is 
reasonable — a proceeding that is not mentioned in OPS-217.98 
In this way, the Court noted that security certificates made use of 
intelligence as evidence and that such evidential uses of intelligence 
would require CSIS to adjust their retention policies to observe 
evidentiary standards. 
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5. Section 7 of the Charter 
The Court interpreted section 12 of the CSIS Act in light of section 7 
of the Charter and the security certificate context in which Adil 
Charkaoui asked for disclosure of the notes taken of CSIS interviews 
with him. Building on a theme expressed in its first Charkaoui case,
99
 the 
Court rejected the idea that section 7 rights were confined to the criminal 
justice system. Instead, the Court stated: 
But whether or not the constitutional guarantees of section 7 of the 
Charter apply does not turn on a formal distinction between the 
different areas of law. Rather, it depends on the severity of the 
consequences of the state’s actions for the individual’s fundamental 
interests of liberty and security and, in some cases, the right to life. By 
its very nature, the security certificate procedure can place these rights 
in serious jeopardy, as the Court recognized in Charkaoui. To protect 
them, it becomes necessary to recognize a duty to disclose evidence 
based on s. 7.
100
 
The Court then took note that CSIS investigations “play a central role in 
the issuance of a security certificate” and that “the consequences of 
security certificates are often more severe than those of many criminal 
charges”.101 The context of the case made the need to retain the original 
notes pressing. 
The Court also stressed the importance of retaining original notes so 
that both the Ministers who issue security certificates and the judges who 
review the reasonableness of the certificates would have an opportunity 
to verify CSIS’s analysis and conclusions against the original data. 
Justices LeBel and Fish stated: 
As things stand, the destruction by CSIS officers of their operational 
notes compromises the very function of judicial review. To uphold the 
right to procedural fairness of people in Mr. Charkaoui’s position, CSIS 
should be required to retain all the information in its possession and to 
disclose it to the ministers and the designated judge. The ministers and 
the designated judge will in turn be responsible for verifying the 
information they are given.
102
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The Court returned to the theme of verification when in the course of 
holding that Ministers could submit new evidence to support the security 
certificate, the Court stated that “receiving new evidence in the course of 
this ongoing verification process is fairer, since such evidence can be as 
beneficial to the named person as to the ministers”.103 The importance of 
verifying the conclusions and analysis of intelligence analysts will be 
discussed in the last part of this paper. With respect to section 7 of the 
Charter, however, the Court’s emphasis on verification is also supported 
by other section 7 jurisprudence which recognizes the possibility of error 
and unreliable evidence that can result in the detention of innocent 
persons.
104
 
6. Is Charkaoui II Based on Section 12 of the CSIS Act and/or 
Section 7 of the Charter? 
The ultimate decision by the Court with respect to the duty to retain 
and disclose the original notes is a product of statutory interpretation of 
section 12 of the CSIS Act as influenced by the values of section 7 of the 
Charter and the principles of procedural fairness. The Court made 
reference to Charter values even though it did not recognize there was an 
ambiguity when the statute was interpreted in a purposive manner as 
required by cases such as Bell Express Vu Limited Partnership v. Rex.
105
 
Although the decision may be stronger by being supported by 
multiple legal sources, the amalgam nature of the ruling makes the 
decision less clear than it might have been. There may be a tendency in 
some quarters to read the decision narrowly as limited to the security 
certificate context that engages section 7 of the Charter and particular 
concerns about the procedural fairness of the decisions made by 
Ministers and reviewing judges in that process. Such an approach would, 
however, discount the Court’s interpretation of section 12 of the CSIS 
Act which applies to all of CSIS’s intelligence-collection activities. In 
this vein, it is important to reiterate that the Court said that the reference 
to intelligence in section 12 refers not only to “summaries prepared by 
officers” but also to “original operational notes” that are a “better source 
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105 [2002] S.C.J. No. 43, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.). 
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of information, and of evidence”106 than the analytical summaries. 
Moreover, the Court clearly stated that nothing in section 12 “requires 
CSIS to destroy the information it collects. Rather, in our view, section 
12 of the CSIS Act demands that it retain its operational notes. To 
paraphrase section 12, CSIS must acquire information to the extent that it 
is strictly necessary in order to carry out its mandate, and must then 
analyse and retain relevant information and intelligence”.107 The Court’s 
decision that CSIS should retain intelligence was rooted in section 12 of 
the CSIS Act and it would be a mistake to limit the Court’s holding to 
the security certificate process that engaged liberty and security interests 
under section 7 of the Charter.
108
 For example, the Court cited a decision 
by SIRC that had complained about the destruction of original notes in 
the context of a denial of a security clearance to Mr. Liddar. It also cited 
the Arar Commission with respect to the importance of accuracy and 
precision when intelligence is shared with other countries.
109
 Both of 
these contexts have nothing to do with security certificates. The Court’s 
interpretation of section 12 of the CSIS Act should apply across the 
board to all of CSIS’s activities and not be limited to the security 
certificate context.  
Other agencies involved in the security certificate process such as the 
Canadian Border Service Agency and Immigration Canada, however, 
should take note of the Court’s comments about the importance of 
retention and disclosure of information given that the “consequences of 
security certificates are often more severe than those of many criminal 
charges”.110 Even without the statutory re-enforcement of section 12 of 
the CSIS Act, those agencies may in some contexts have an independent 
obligation under section 7 of the Charter to retain and disclose relevant 
information to security certificate detainees. In short, there are two 
independent legal theories that support the conclusion that material must 
be retained for possible disclosure: the Court’s interpretation of section 
12 of the CSIS Act and its interpretation of the requirements of section 7 
of the Charter and closely related notions of procedural fairness. Both 
theories applied on the facts of Charkaoui II, but each separate theory on 
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107 Id., at para. 38. 
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its own could support a conclusion that material should be retained for 
possible disclosure. 
7. Privacy and the Distinction Between General and Targeted 
Investigations 
Although the Court interpreted section 12 of the CSIS Act to 
authorize the retention of properly collected intelligence, the Court did 
not deal directly with the restrictions that section 12 places on the 
collection of intelligence. This is unfortunate because a likely response to 
the Court’s decision will be that CSIS will retain much more raw 
intelligence. Indeed, modern computer technology would potentially 
allow CSIS to retain massive amounts of raw intelligence in excess of the 
prior holdings of the RCMP’s Security Service which were criticized by 
the McDonald Commission and civil libertarians.
111
  
The Court was not completely oblivious to privacy values in 
Charkaoui II and it observed: 
The argument based on the importance of protecting privacy applies 
primarily to general investigations. Where targeted investigations are 
concerned, the interests at stake differ. Privacy should of course be 
respected, but not to the point of giving inaccurate or unverifiable 
information to the ministers and the judge. In the context of the 
procedures relating to the issuance of the security certificate and the 
review of its reasonableness, it may prove necessary to disclose notes 
to the ministers and the designated judge.
112
 
The Court’s implicit assumption seems to be that the main danger to 
privacy comes from “general investigations” that do not involve named 
individuals and groups. Hence, the duty to retain intelligence does not 
apply in such investigations. 
The Court’s concern that general investigations pose a threat to 
privacy makes intuitive sense. For example, a CSIS investigation into 
certain forms of political or religious activity or dissent could result in 
the investigation of those who were only engaged in legitimate activity 
or dissent or those who may have simply associated for social, economic, 
religious or political reasons with an individual or group that could be a 
                                                                                                             
111 For a concrete example of some of the material collected and retained by the RCMP’s 
Security Service, see “Former RCMP Security Service Files on René Lévesque Now Available”, 
containing numerous press clippings and some heavily redacted material. Online: <http://www. 
collectionscanada.gc.ca/whats-new/013-314-e.html>. 
112 Charkaoui II, supra, note 4, at para. 44. 
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legitimate target of a CSIS investigation. In addition, the need to retain 
intelligence to promote adjudicative fairness is less pressing because 
enforcement actions ranging from the denial of a security clearance, to 
the issuance of a security certificate or a criminal prosecution are 
unlikely to result from a general investigation that does not focus on a 
specific individual or group. 
Although it recognized that privacy concerns could still be in play 
with respect to targeted investigations of specific individuals and groups, 
the Court concluded that in such cases the balance of interests differed. 
In other words, concerns about accurate decision-making and adjudicative 
fairness favoured the retention of the original intelligence over the values 
of privacy. The need to retain accurate information in targeted investigations 
would also presumably extend to specific persons who were not targets 
of the investigation. For example, Maher Arar became a person of 
interest in an investigation of another target. A person denied a security 
clearance might have an interest in knowing what others said about him 
or her. Leaving aside the possibility that CSIS might target persons who 
are not legitimate targets because, for example, they simply engage in 
political or religious dissent, there is a possibility that the retention of 
information about those who associate with legitimate targets will adversely 
affect their privacy.  
The distinction that the Court relies upon with respect to general 
versus targeted investigations raises the question of how CSIS actually 
conducts its investigations. Unfortunately, there is limited public 
information about CSIS’s targeting practices. The 2005-2006 annual 
report of the Security Intelligence Review Committee contains some 
interesting information about the authorized targets of CSIS investigations. 
In that year, there were 594 authorized targets, with 335 of the targets 
being for counter-terrorism and 192 being for counter-intelligence. Only 
40 of the 594 authorized targets were identified as “issues/events” as 
opposed to individuals or organizations.
113
 If the Court in Charkaoui II 
was making reference to this distinction, it appears that more than 90 per 
cent of CSIS’s targeted investigations relate to individuals and groups. 
Such investigations would then engage the duty to retain and possibly 
disclose intelligence articulated in Charkaoui II. It is possible, however, 
that the Court was distinguishing between all targeted investigations, 
including those perhaps that target issues and events as opposed to 
                                                                                                             
113 SIRC Annual Report, supra, note 26, Table 3, at 23. Unfortunately, similar data is not 
included in the 2006-2007 or 2007-2008 annual SIRC reports or in the CSIS annual reports. 
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individuals and organizations, and the other activities in which CSIS 
engages, such as open source research and the like. In either event, these 
figures suggest that the exemption of general investigations from the 
duty to retain and disclose may do little work in protecting privacy. 
A finding that CSIS devotes most of its investigations to targeted 
individuals or groups is not a criticism of CSIS’s targeting decisions. 
Given limited resources and the risks of targeting legitimate dissent when 
one focuses on issues and events, it may be proper for CSIS to focus on 
specific individuals and groups who may be involved in activities that 
threaten the security of Canada. The targeting of events and issues could 
in some cases raise concerns about targeting legitimate political dissent 
or religious activity. The main point is simply that the Court may have 
(1) underestimated that the vast majority of CSIS investigations appear to 
target specific individuals and groups; and (2) overestimated the extent to 
which the exemption of “general” investigations from the duty to retain 
intelligence will protect privacy. If this is indeed the case, it will be very 
important for CSIS and its review bodies to ensure that targeting 
decisions are made carefully and legally, because once a group or an 
individual is targeted, it is now likely as a result of Charkaoui II that the 
raw intelligence on that person will be retained indefinitely.
114
 
8. Privacy and the Limits on Collection of Intelligence in Section 12 
of the CSIS Act 
Fortunately, there are some restrictions in the CSIS Act that are 
designed to protect privacy. Section 12 of the CSIS Act instructs CSIS 
that it shall collect information and intelligence with respect to “activities 
that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to 
the security of Canada”. In this way, CSIS must demonstrate that there is 
a reasonable suspicion related to threats to the security of Canada as 
defined in section 2 of the CSIS Act. The structure of section 12 of the 
CSIS Act follows the recommendations of the McDonald Commission, 
which stressed the importance of a statutory definition of the mandate of 
a new civilian security intelligence in order to ensure that the new agency 
respected legitimate dissent in a democracy and to ensure that its 
activities were subject to the rule of law.  
                                                                                                             
114 The Court does not address how long intelligence should be retained and there may be a 
case for legislation or regulation to address this issue which will also involve the related issue of the 
preservation of CSIS records for archival historical research. 
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Even when CSIS is investigating reasonably suspected threats to the 
security of Canada, section 12 of the CSIS Act places an additional 
restriction on its activities: information and intelligence are to be 
collected “to the extent that it is strictly necessary”. The reference to 
necessity follows recommendations made by the McDonald Commission 
that the activities of a new civilian security intelligence agency should be 
guided by principles of proportionality. Principles of proportionality 
have subsequently played an important role under the Charter, most 
notably in relation to the justification of reasonable limits on Charter 
rights under section 1 of the Charter. There is little jurisprudence that 
illuminates either the meaning of threats to the security of Canada as 
defined in section 2 of the CSIS Act or the precise nature of the “to the 
extent that it is strictly necessary” limitation in section 12 of the CSIS 
Act. The Supreme Court in Charkaoui II did not attempt to fill this gap 
or to flesh out how restrictions in section 12 of the CSIS Act should 
govern the collection of intelligence, which under its ruling is now likely 
to be retained by CSIS for much longer periods. The Court’s failure to do 
so is unfortunate because it would have naturally flowed from its 
discussion of privacy and the retention of intelligence. Although some 
defend minimalist rulings in the national security area,
115
 national 
security issues are rarely litigated
116
 and the Court can provide important 
guidance in the few that are litigated.  
Given the possible adverse effects that increased retention of 
intelligence could have on privacy values, it would have been helpful for 
the Court to have provided some guidance about the proper interpretation 
of the rest of section 12 of the CSIS Act, particularly as it related to the 
collection of intelligence. Although section 12 is the centrepiece of the 
CSIS Act and has been in place for a quarter of a century, there still has 
been no definitive judicial interpretation of when activities are 
reasonably suspected of being a threat to the security of Canada or when 
the collection of intelligence is strictly necessary to investigate such 
threats.
117
 In the absence of such guidance from the Court, much of the 
work in defining the limits of its mandate will fall on CSIS and review 
bodies such as SIRC and the Privacy Commissioner. The increased 
                                                                                                             
115 Cass Sunstein, “Minimalism at War” [2004] Sup. Ct. Rev. 47.  
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security clearance and an access to information request. See Thomson v. Canada, [1992] S.C.J. No. 
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retention of intelligence that will be promoted by Charkaoui II makes it 
only more important that the intelligence be legally and properly 
collected in the first place. 
9. What Should Be Disclosed and to Whom? 
As in Khadr, the disclosure authorized in Charkaoui II was far from 
absolute. The Court at several junctures noted that the reviewing judge 
would still be obliged under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
not to disclose to Charkaoui any material that if disclosed could harm 
national security or endanger any person.
118
 Indeed this standard is more 
restrictive than the standards under section 38 of the Canada Evidence 
Act that were applied in Khadr and would be applied in cases arising 
from McNeil
119
 that may require the disclosure of CSIS information in 
terrorism prosecutions. Under section 38 the designated judge is allowed 
to balance and reconcile the competing interests in disclosure and non-
disclosure whereas under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
that designated judge is absolutely prohibited from disclosing any 
information to the detainee that would harm national security or any 
individual. In reality, this means that much of the intelligence in security 
certificate cases that is subject to disclosure under Charkaoui II will be 
disclosed to the security-cleared special advocates created in the wake of 
Charkaoui I and not to the actual detainees and their lawyers. 
Although Khadr, Charkaoui II and McNeil all send definite and 
important signals to CSIS about the need to retain original intelligence 
and its possible disclosure in subsequent legal proceedings, all of the 
decisions recognize that disclosure will not be absolute. All three 
decisions provide the government an opportunity to justify non-
disclosure on grounds relating to harms to national security. In the 
security certificate context, it is likely that a significant amount of the 
raw intelligence will not be disclosed to the detainee on the basis that its 
disclosure would harm national security or other persons, including those 
who have collected the intelligence. In such instances, the raw intelligence 
                                                                                                             
118 Charkaoui II, supra, note 4, at paras. 45, 63, 77. 
119 Supra, note 6. CSIS information could be subject to disclosure in a terrorism prosecution 
on the basis (1) that CSIS was an investigating agency directly subject to Stinchcombe; (2) that the 
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will be disclosed to the special advocate, who must then obtain judicial 
permission in order to consult the detainee or others when necessary to 
make inquiries about the context in which the raw intelligence was 
collected.  
The disclosure of more raw intelligence to the special advocates will 
likely result in more requests by special advocates to presiding judges to 
allow them to contact the detainees about the meaning and accuracy of 
the raw intelligence. It may also lead the special advocates to seek 
permission from the judge to share the raw intelligence with intelligence 
experts who can opine on the meaning and reliability of the raw intelligence 
and whether it supports the analytical conclusions drawn from it by CSIS 
and others. Although the Court stresses the value of the retention of the 
raw intelligence in allowing Ministers and reviewing judges to verify the 
analytical conclusions drawn by CSIS, this process will be assisted by 
the adversarial challenge that has been promoted by the special advocates 
created in the wake of Charkaoui I.  
10. Remedies for Failure to Retain and Disclose Intelligence  
Although CSIS should respond to Charkaoui II by changing its 
policy to destroy intelligence, the immediate challenge in many security 
certificate and other proceedings may be to devise remedies for the 
failure to disclose raw intelligence that CSIS has already destroyed. As 
discussed above, Adil Charkaoui sought both the exclusion of evidence 
and a permanent stay of proceedings as remedies for CSIS’s failure to 
retain and disclose intelligence in the form of the original notes of 
interviews with him. 
The Court rejected the request for a stay of proceedings stressing that 
the stay should be “a remedy of last resort”120 and that it was premature 
to issue such a drastic remedy while the proceedings were ongoing. The 
Court also noted that the designated judge had granted an appropriate 
remedy when he had postponed proceedings in response to late 
disclosure in 2005 of the summary of CSIS interviews with Charkaoui in 
early 2002.
121
 This approach is consistent with the Court’s restrictive 
approach in criminal cases with respect to granting stays of proceedings 
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as a Charter remedy.
122
 The Court only briefly adverted to its own 
extensive jurisprudence on breaches of the duty to retain evidence that 
has been developed in the criminal context
123
 and it warned about the 
need for a contextual approach. CSIS’s destruction of intelligence in 
targeted investigations after the Court’s decision in Charkaoui II will 
likely be found to be unacceptable negligence under R. v. La.
124
 The 
issue of whether there was unacceptable negligence may have to be 
litigated in the many cases where the intelligence was destroyed before 
Charkaoui II. In a sense, Charkaoui was given the retroactive benefit of 
the Court’s ruling in his case as is the general rule in litigation.125 
The task of devising an appropriate remedy was delegated to the 
reviewing judge who would hear evidence from those who took the 
interview notes. Given that much relevant intelligence will likely have 
already been destroyed pursuant to CSIS policy in Charkaoui and the 
other security certificate cases, the task of devising appropriate and just 
remedies under section 24(1) of the Charter for any section 7 violations 
caused by the destruction of relevant intelligence will only add to the 
already onerous litigation that surrounds the use of security certificates 
based on allegations of involvement with terrorism. In some cases, the 
presiding judge may have to exclude evidence of intelligence conclusions 
if the raw intelligence that is necessary to verify the conclusions has been 
destroyed.  
The Court in Charkaoui II left some room for judges in other cases 
to find that a failure to disclose relevant intelligence did not violate 
section 7 of the Charter or section 12 of the CSIS Act when it warned 
that the duty of retention was not absolute, and that “while it is true that 
CSIS officers routinely take notes, they doubtless do not prepare accurate 
transcripts of their interviews with the individuals they are investigating. 
Finally, important information may go missing as a result of simple 
human error.”126 Although these scenarios are possible, it is likely that, as 
in Charkaoui II, much raw intelligence in ongoing cases will have been 
deliberately destroyed pursuant to CSIS policy. It is also likely that 
allegations of a failure to disclose relevant intelligence and requests for 
remedies for that failure will become a staple of litigation in the ongoing 
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security certificate cases. When the raw intelligence has been retained, it 
may also be necessary for the special advocate to ask permission from 
the judge to consult with others to understand the full significance of the 
intelligence and its reliability. Such litigation will add to the already 
daunting complexities of security certificate cases, again raising the issue 
of the sustainability of such procedures.
127
 
V. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF KHADR AND CHARKAOUI II AND THE 
“JUDICIALIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE” 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Khadr and Charkaoui II, when 
combined with the Court’s even more recent decision in McNeil, send a 
clear signal to CSIS that its intelligence holdings are not exempt from 
disclosure. In light of these rulings, CSIS should no longer rely on the 
simplistic idea that it does not collect evidence or that CSIS agents 
should destroy original notes or raw intelligence in order to ensure the 
secrecy of such intelligence. Although the combined effects of these 
rulings do not make CSIS a police force, they do move CSIS closer to 
the practices of police officers with respect to the collection and retention 
of original information. In this way, the rulings are part of the 
judicialization of intelligence identified by CSIS Director Jim Judd a few 
months before the release of Khadr and Charkaoui II. 
A complex phenomenon such as the judicialization of intelligence 
will have both positive and negative effects. Some likely effects of this 
process will be outlined below before an initial judgment is made. Any 
such judgment should be tentative because the process of the 
judicialization of intelligence remains dynamic. It is dependent on how 
CSIS, those affected by CSIS intelligence and the courts respond to the 
possibility revealed in Khadr and Charkaoui II that more CSIS 
intelligence will be subject to disclosure in legal proceedings.  
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1. Possible Harms of the Judicialization of Intelligence 
(a) Disclosure of Legitimate Secrets? 
One possible harm of the judicialization of intelligence is that it 
could result in the disclosure of secret information that will harm 
confidential sources and methods used by CSIS and allied intelligence 
agencies. One oft-cited example of such harms is a report that Osama bin 
Laden stopped using a satellite phone following press reports that such 
calls were being monitored by American intelligence agencies. The exact 
accuracy of these claims has recently been questioned,
128
 but the 
possibility that the judicialization of intelligence could lead to disclosure 
of material that should be kept secret cannot be ignored. This is 
especially the case given Canada’s oft-noted reliance on intelligence 
provided by foreign agencies. 
Claims that the Supreme Court in Khadr and Charkaoui II has been 
insensitive to CSIS’s demands for secrecy cannot, however, be sustained. 
In a number of cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that 
CSIS has legitimate secrets to keep and that many of these secrets are on 
loan from foreign agencies who apparently provide Canada with most of 
its intelligence.
129
 The Supreme Court did not actually order that 
intelligence be disclosed in either Khadr or Charkaoui II. Instead the 
Court ordered that further proceedings be held to determine what 
evidence should be disclosed. In Khadr, these proceedings involved a 
specially designated judge of the Federal Court balancing competing 
interests in disclosure and non-disclosure under section 38 of the Canada 
Evidence Act. In Charkoui II, the designated judge would be required by 
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act not to disclose any 
information to the detainee that would harm national security or any 
person. In both cases, the Court made generous allowance for the 
protection of legitimate secrets. The same is true of the more recent 
McNeil case where the Court recognized that a successful claim of 
privilege,
130
 such as informer privilege or the national security 
confidentiality privilege under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act, 
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could prevent disclosure of relevant information either under 
Stinchcombe
131
 or under the third party procedures articulated in 
O’Connor.132  
It appears unlikely that cases such as Khadr or Charkaoui II will 
result in the disclosure of intelligence that will harm ongoing national 
security investigations or the lives of vulnerable sources. If a judge, 
however, makes a mistake and orders too much disclosure, the Attorney 
General of Canada can issue a non-disclosure certificate under section 
38.13 of the Canada Evidence Act to prevent disclosure under that 
section. The options are a bit less clear if too much disclosure is ordered 
under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. Under that Act, 
judges are instructed not to disclose any information that would harm 
national security or endanger any person and they are not allowed to 
balance the competing interests in disclosure and non-disclosure. In some 
cases, it may be possible for the government to stop disclosure by 
withdrawing those parts of its allegations that make the disclosure 
relevant. In an extreme case, the Court could prevent disclosure by 
abandoning the security certificate proceeding.  
(b) Creating False Confidence in the Accuracy of Intelligence? 
Another possible danger is that the retention of raw intelligence to 
allow for verification and adversarial challenge may suggest that 
intelligence is actually more reliable than it is. The process of 
verification and adversarial challenge will only be as accurate and 
reliable as the underlying data. The fact that intelligence after Charkaoui 
II may be verified against the raw intelligence will not necessarily mean 
that the intelligence itself is reliable or accurate. It is also possible that 
adversarial challenge of the intelligence will fail to reveal inaccuracies in 
the intelligence. 
Although the above dangers are real, they would exist with or 
without the judicialization of intelligence that is contemplated in the 
retention and disclosure of raw intelligence. Such retention and 
disclosure will at least allow security-cleared special advocates an 
opportunity to provide innocent explanations for raw intelligence that 
might on its face confirm suspicions. It should also allow for challenges 
to the methods that were used to obtain the raw intelligence, especially in 
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cases where methods used abroad may potentially adversely affect the 
reliability of the intelligence. The ability of the special advocate to 
challenge the raw intelligence may in some cases require the special 
advocate to be able to consult with the detainee or others after having 
seen the raw intelligence.
133
 A refusal to allow the special advocate to 
engage in such consultations could impair that person’s ability to 
challenge the intelligence and could increase the chance that unreliable 
intelligence will wrongly be perceived as reliable. 
There is a danger that retention and disclosure of the raw intelligence 
may create a false confidence in intelligence that may have been 
selectively collected and may not be reliable. That said, the danger of 
overly filtered or unreliable intelligence would persist even in the 
absence of cases such as Charkaoui II. The retention and disclosure of 
the raw intelligence at least provides some opportunity for verification 
and adversarial challenge. 
(c)  Increased Retention of Intelligence as a Threat to Privacy? 
The most serious danger of a judicialization of intelligence that 
results in increased retention of raw intelligence is its potential threat to 
privacy. Charkaoui II could promote a process that Stanley A. Cohen has 
referred to as “dossier building” where intelligence, including dubious 
intelligence based on rumours, associations and unsubstantiated suspicions, 
is retained perhaps permanently on file or more likely in an accessible 
electronic database.
134
 It would technologically be possible for CSIS to 
retain far more files on individuals than the former Security Service of 
the RCMP, which was criticized by the McDonald Commission for the 
extensive files that it held on many Canadians, including some who were 
participating in legitimate forms of dissent and even some in minority 
political parties such as the Parti Québécois and the New Democratic 
Party.  
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A possible answer to these privacy concerns, however, can be found 
in CSIS’s mandate and its review structure. Section 12 of the CSIS Act 
restricts the collection of intelligence to that which is strictly necessary to 
investigate reasonably suspected threats to the security of Canada as 
defined in section 2 of the Act. Unfortunately, the Court did not elaborate 
on the meaning of this part of section 12 in its decision in Charkaoui II. 
This was a missed opportunity by the Court to flesh out how the concept 
of reasonable suspicion, recognized in other parts of the law,
135
 applies to 
CSIS’s investigations of threats to the security of Canada. Moreover, the 
Court could also have explored how principles of proportionality 
articulated by the McDonald Commission and in its own section 1 
jurisprudence might have informed and disciplined the requirement that 
even in cases of reasonably suspected threats to the security of Canada, 
CSIS should only collect intelligence to the extent that it is strictly 
necessary for the investigation. These are critical parts of section 12 of 
the CSIS Act that the Court could have interpreted in response to the 
legitimate concerns that it discussed that CSIS’s increased retention of 
intelligence could harm privacy. 
Now that the Supreme Court has clarified that section 12 does not 
justify the destruction of raw intelligence, it will be even more important 
for CSIS and its review bodies to ensure that CSIS only collects 
intelligence pursuant to its lawful mandate. This is an important part of 
the project of subjecting CSIS to the rule of law. In this sense, Charkaoui 
II is only relevant to one part of the intelligence cycle, namely, the 
retention of raw intelligence that is the basis for CSIS’s analysis and 
conclusions. Given that raw intelligence is much more likely to be 
collected after Charkaoui II, it becomes even more important to ensure 
that the intelligence is properly and lawfully collected pursuant to CSIS’s 
mandate. This process would be facilitated if CSIS was able to provide 
more public information about its targeting process and if SIRC devoted 
more attention to this critical topic in its annual public reports about its 
review of CSIS.  
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2. Possible Benefits of the Judicialization of Intelligence 
(a) Disclosure as a Means to Reveal Tunnel Vision and Other Errors in 
Intelligence?  
The Court in Charkaoui II stressed that retention of the original notes 
or raw intelligence was required to ensure that both the Ministers and the 
reviewing judges could discharge their duties under the statutory scheme. 
In both cases, the Ministers and reviewing judges should have access to 
the original data and notes to ensure the accuracy of the analytical reports 
and conclusions that CSIS prepared.
136
 The Court recognized that the 
analytical reports prepared by intelligence agencies could be overstated 
or just plain wrong. If criminal trials can reach wrong conclusions about 
guilt or innocence, it should hardly be surprising that intelligence 
analysis which is conducted in secret and without adversarial challenge 
may also be wrong. Nevertheless, sensational but erroneous conclusions 
made by those who have secret raw intelligence — for example, 
conclusions that Maher Arar and his wife were associated with Al Qaeda 
or that five of the September 11 terrorists entered the United States from 
Canada
137
 — have an unfortunate way of sticking around long after the 
original data for such conclusions has been found to be lacking. 
Lest it be thought that it is only lawyers who are concerned about the 
fallibility of intelligence, much of the writing by intelligence practitioners 
and scholars today accepts the possibility if not the inevitability that 
intelligence analysts will at times reach conclusions that are wrong, 
including some conclusions that are not supported by the underlying 
data. As Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, two leading intelligence scholars, 
have observed, intelligence “remains an intellectual process … However 
many ‘facts’ are compiled or integrated they still do not ‘speak for 
                                                                                                             
136 Supra, note 4, at para. 62. The Court observed:  
As things stand, the destruction by CSIS officers of their operational notes compromises 
the very function of judicial review. To uphold the right to procedural fairness of people 
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exclude any evidence that might pose a threat to national security and summarize the 
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reliability — for the named person. 
137 Andrew Mitrovica, “Former US spy linked 9/11 terrorists to Canada”, Toronto Star 
(April 24, 2009), A23. 
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themselves’.”138 A former CIA analyst has written that “in order to tell 
decisionmakers about what is going on overseas and who is doing it, 
intelligence analysts spend much of their time linking disparate data 
together to either ‘connect the dots’ or ‘create the mosaic’.” He adds that 
“because raw intelligence data … is usually fragmentary — providing an 
incomplete picture of what is actually going on overseas or in the mind 
of the adversary — the gaps in the data must be filled in with 
assumptions drawn from various sources, running from the theoretical 
literature to the analysts’ idiosyncratic judgment.”139 Intelligence analysis 
is an inherently creative process, but it should be disciplined by the 
ability to check the analysis against the raw data. This is especially 
important when individuals will be harmed as a result of the intelligence 
analysis. 
Recent and spectacular intelligence failures include the failure to 
connect the dots of September 11 and the false connection of the dots 
with respect to weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Richard Betts has 
argued that intelligence failures are inevitable because of the ambiguity 
of much raw intelligence and the need for intelligence analysts to provide 
governments with workable advice.
140
 Another former intelligence 
analyst for the CIA has stressed that “intelligence collection systems 
produce sensory data, not intelligence. Only the human mind can add the 
discernment and knowledge that makes sense of it. It is only after ‘raw’ 
data are verified for accuracy and evaluated for significance can they 
become the substance of intelligence.”141 
Richard Heuer Jr., who worked within the CIA from 1951 to 1979 
and who retired as the head of the methodology unit in the Director of 
Intelligence’s political analysis office, has warned of the dangers of 
premature closure, selective perception of relevant facts, cognitive biases 
and not considering alternative hypotheses.
142
 In what in the criminal 
justice context would be called tunnel vision, he has observed that 
“people do not naturally seek disconfirming evidence, and when such 
                                                                                                             
138 Peter Gill & Mark Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2006), at 84. 
139 Stephen Marrin, “Adding Value to the Intelligence Product” in L. Johnson, Handbook of 
Intelligence Studies (Oxford: Routledge, 2007), at 200. 
140 Richard Betts, Enemies of Intelligence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 
ch. 5; Richard Betts, “Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable”, in 
L. Johnson & J. Wirtz, Intelligence and National Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008), at 125. 
141 John Hollister Hedley, “Analysis for Strategic Intelligence”, in L. Johnson, Handbook of 
Intelligence Studies (Oxford: Routledge, 2007) 213. 
142 Heuer, supra, note 29, at 28, 41, 59, 175. 
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evidence is received it tends to be discounted.”143 Heuer has warned that 
intelligence analysis is closer to the process of writing history than 
conducting scientific analysis.
144
 Another person who works in military 
intelligence has drawn on Heuer’s work to warn:  
humans are prone to self-confirmation in cases where equivocal 
information exists or, in other words, ‘we perceive what we expect to 
perceive’. A wealth of research has demonstrated the human tendency 
to search out and attend only to evidence that confirms one’s ideas, 
beliefs, or hypotheses. The problem with the confirmatory tendency is 
that only information supportive of one’s beliefs is attended to, even in 
the face of extremely disconfirming information. Information that could 
provide corrective feedback that one’s beliefs are in error is rarely 
evaluated. This process of searching for confirmation can lead to some 
very inaccurate conclusions, and may lead to an increased, perhaps 
unjustified, confidence in one’s conclusions.145  
All of this analysis suggests that CSIS, as much as the Court, should be 
concerned about preserving raw intelligence so that it can verify the 
accuracy of its analytical intelligence. 
The Court’s repeated references in Charkaoui II to the ability of 
Ministers and judges to verify intelligence against raw intelligence 
alludes to the increased recognition of the fallibility of the intelligence 
product. In this sense, the decision is very much influenced by the 
findings that the Arar Commission and SIRC respectively reached in the 
Maher Arar and Bhupindar Liddar cases that unsupported and erroneous 
conclusions had been drawn in the intelligence process in a manner that 
harmed these men. The Court’s decision is designed to allow the relevant 
decision-makers to review the raw data on which CSIS bases its analysis. 
Retention of the raw data increases the accountability of CSIS and 
provides a basis for a Minister or a judge to ask CSIS some very hard 
questions. That said, the check on CSIS is still limited by whether the 
raw intelligence has already been destroyed pursuant to the CSIS policy 
found deficient in Charkaoui II and by the reliability and relevance of the 
raw data itself.  
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(b) Increased Adjudicative Fairness? 
The ultimate objective of the proceedings in Khadr and Charkaoui II 
is to increase the fairness of the proceedings that both men face. Omar 
Khadr’s ability to defend himself in American proceedings could 
potentially be improved by the disclosure of the interviews he had with 
CSIS officials and by information that CSIS shared with the Americans. 
The adequacy of the disclosure that Khadr will receive from American 
officials remains very much in doubt.
146
 Unfortunately, the disclosure 
obligations articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in his case are 
defined narrowly in a manner that mirrors the limited extra-territorial 
reach of the Charter. In other words, the Court has limited disclosure to 
information collected or shared with the Americans as a direct 
consequence of the Guantanamo interviews that implicated Canada in an 
international human rights violation. The disclosure obligations in Khadr 
do not extend to other Stinchcombe-relevant material that Canada 
possesses, including material that it has shared with the Americans that is 
not related to the interviews. These restrictions on disclosure impose real 
limits on how helpful the decision will be to Omar Khadr. A broader 
definition of what should be disclosed to Khadr would not have 
threatened legitimate secrecy interests because the government would 
still have been able to argue that the information was not relevant to the 
charges faced by Khadr and that the information was privileged by 
national security confidentiality. Such a tailored approach is better than 
imposing broad and categorical restrictions on disclosure that have the 
potential to deny important and even potentially exculpatory information 
to the accused. 
The Court’s decision in Charkaoui II at first blush seems more 
generous to the affected person because it defines the disclosure 
obligations more broadly than Khadr. The Court in Charkaoui II was 
appropriately aware of the severe consequences of the security certificate 
process and the fact that section 7 of the Charter is not restricted to the 
criminal process. The Court in Charkaoui II laid to rest any idea that 
section 12 of the CSIS Act provides a statutory justification for the 
                                                                                                             
146 A plurality of the United States Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 124 
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destruction of properly collected intelligence. At the same time, 
Charkaoui II did not actually order that the interview notes or other raw 
intelligence be disclosed to the detainee. Much of this material may 
already have been destroyed pursuant to CSIS policy. The Court rejected 
a stay of proceedings as a drastic and premature remedy for such 
destruction. Even to the extent that the material has been retained, the 
Court recognized that the judge would still have to filter out any material 
that if disclosed would harm national security or any person. To be sure, 
there are benefits in terms of adjudicative fairness in allowing Ministers, 
reviewing judges and security-cleared special advocates to see all the raw 
and available intelligence. At the same time, however, Charkaoui II may 
not dramatically increase the actual disclosure made to the detainee. Such 
conclusions are troubling for adjudicative fairness,
147
 but as discussed 
above, they also belie any claim that the Court has effectively opened 
CSIS’s vaults to public disclosure. The value of Charkaoui II in terms of 
adjudicative fairness may well depend on what the special advocates can 
do with the raw intelligence. As suggested above, special advocates may 
find it necessary to return to the detainee or others in order to assess the 
broader context and meaning of raw intelligence to which they may gain 
access under Charkaoui II.  
(c) Increased Accountability for CSIS? 
Disclosure of CSIS intelligence not only has the potential to increase 
the fairness of legal proceedings, but it can also provide a valuable 
accountability check on the accuracy, fairness and precision of the 
analytical conclusions that CSIS draws from its raw intelligence. The 
Court in Charkaoui II was influenced by Commissioner O’Connor’s 
finding that an analytical conclusion (admittedly made by the RCMP and 
not by CSIS) that Maher Arar and his wife were Islamic extremists 
associated with Al Qaeda was inaccurate. Full disclosure of the original 
intelligence is a necessary precondition to ensuring that the conclusions 
reached by intelligence analysts are fair, accurate and supported by the 
raw intelligence. 
The Court seemed to believe that the Ministers of Public Safety and 
Immigration who decide to issue security certificates would be in a 
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position to verify the intelligence provided by CSIS to justify the signing 
of a security certificate and to justify the maintenance of the security 
certificate process. Although the Ministers do have this responsibility, it 
is not clear how well they have discharged the responsibility given their 
other responsibilities and position within the government. The Ministers 
may be tempted to defer to CSIS’s expertise in evaluating intelligence, 
but they should now have access to all the relevant intelligence before 
they decide to sign a security certificate. It is also noteworthy that the 
Ministers have not signed a security certificate in a case with allegations 
of terrorism since they signed Mr. Charkaoui’s certificate in 2003.  
The reviewing judge is in a better position than the Ministers to 
verify CSIS’s analysis against the raw intelligence. The reviewing judge 
may have or develop expertise in intelligence matters and the judge enjoys 
the protections of judicial independence. In addition, the judge should be 
assisted by adversarial arguments provided by detainees and special 
advocates that even the most diligent and expert Minister will not be able 
to access. 
Although CSIS’s review body SIRC already should have access to 
all CSIS material, it should also benefit from Charkaoui II to the extent 
that the decision requires CSIS to retain the original intelligence it 
collects about specific individuals or groups. The Court quoted from a 
SIRC decision in the Liddar case that had expressed frustration with the 
fact that interview notes originally taken by CSIS in the course of a 
security clearance interview were unavailable. After Charkaoui II, SIRC, 
which has the statutory ability to see all information held by CSIS with 
the sole exception of Cabinet confidences,
148
 should be in a better 
position to verify CSIS’s analysis and conclusions against the raw 
intelligence. This is an important side benefit of the Court’s decision and 
again underlines that Charkaoui II has effects far beyond the security 
certificate context. 
(d) Increased Cooperation Between CSIS and Law Enforcement? 
The Court’s decision in Charkaoui II rejects the blunt and outdated 
idea that CSIS is not involved with the collection of evidence that was 
articulated by the Pitfield Committee in 1983 and reflected in the trial 
judge’s original decision that disclosure was not required because CSIS 
was not a police force or involved with the enforcement of the criminal 
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law. In the late 1990s, the Security Intelligence Review Committee 
identified Stinchcombe and the fear of disclosure as a significant 
impediment to CSIS and RCMP cooperation. The trial judge in the Air 
India trial found that CSIS had violated section 7 of the Charter by its 
destruction of the Parmar wiretaps and the original notes of interviews 
with important witnesses. To the extent that the judicialization of 
intelligence represented by cases such as Charkaoui II requires CSIS to 
retain intelligence and to deal with the possibility that intelligence might 
be disclosed in legal proceedings, such a process should make it easier 
for CSIS to work with law enforcement.  
Greater attention to evidentiary standards in the collection and 
retention of intelligence may be one of those happy scenarios where 
reforms can both improve the fairness of the process for those who may 
be accused of terrorism and improve the effectiveness of the system that 
society uses to prevent the very real dangers of terrorism. Such results, 
however, will depend on CSIS accepting the judicialization of 
intelligence process identified by Mr. Judd and promoted by Khadr, 
Charkaoui II and McNeil. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Charkaoui II,149 Khadr150 and 
McNeil
151
 are all consistent with the judicialization of intelligence thesis 
articulated by Jim Judd shortly before the release of those decisions. All 
three decisions send signals to CSIS that the intelligence that it collects 
may be subject to disclosure in subsequent proceedings. Charkaoui II is 
the most important of the decisions for CSIS because it finds that long-
standing CSIS policies that required the destruction of raw intelligence 
are contrary to section 12 of the CSIS Act and, in the security certificate 
context at least, contrary to section 7 of the Charter. Charkaoui II 
represents a fundamental challenge to the way that CSIS has destroyed 
original intelligence in the name of secrecy.  
Jim Judd did not really address whether the judicialization of 
intelligence was a positive or negative development. This is understandable 
given his position, but it will be important that CSIS not resist the trends 
that Mr. Judd has identified and that it not demonstrate too much 
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attachment to or nostalgia for its long-standing policy of destroying raw 
intelligence. Some might argue that the judicialization of intelligence 
places legitimate and important secrets collected by CSIS and shared 
with CSIS by allied agencies at risk. At their crudest, such claims amount 
to attacks that lawyers and judges do not understand the security threats 
that Canada faces or the legitimate needs for secrecy to protect sources 
and CSIS’s relations with allied agencies. Such claims are difficult to 
sustain given the Court’s refusal in both Khadr and Charkaoui II actually 
to order that intelligence be disclosed. In both cases, the government was 
given ample opportunity to justify to the courts the need for non-
disclosure of sensitive intelligence. Some within intelligence agencies 
might object to having to convince judges of the need and justification 
for secrecy, but such objections are really objections to CSIS being 
subject to the rule of law. Such objections are inconsistent with the post-
1982 rejection of absolute state prerogatives to assert unreviewable 
claims of secrecy.  
Other weightier objections can be made against the judicialization of 
intelligence. One concern is that the process of verification of 
intelligence analysis against raw intelligence promoted by Charkaoui II 
might create unwarranted confidence in the reliability and probative 
value of intelligence. The verification process that is promoted by 
Charkaoui II can reveal some errors in intelligence analysis, but it should 
also be remembered that even verified intelligence will only be as 
accurate and precise as the original raw data. The collection of the raw 
data may be skewed and the raw data may be wrong or unreliable. Even 
when verified against raw intelligence, intelligence of the sort that is 
used to support security certificates may still remain much less reliable 
than evidence. Intelligence may be obtained from foreign agencies in 
circumstances that are not conducive to respect for human rights. 
Intelligence may, as in the case of Maher Arar and other Canadians held 
abroad, be based on false confessions made to avoid torture or 
mistreatment. Intelligence linking persons to terrorism could be verified 
against the original raw intelligence, but the intelligence could still be 
wrong if the original information was a false confession or 
misinformation. In many cases, little may be known about how foreign 
agencies obtained the information and so the reliability of the 
intelligence will not be clear. Intelligence can be based on untested and 
untestable hearsay, including rumour and reputation evidence. It may 
view ambiguous behaviour and associations through an interpretative 
lens that can make the agency’s predictions about security threats 
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something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. The retention of intelligence 
under Charkaoui II provides some potential correctives, but intelligence, 
even when verified against the raw intelligence that has been collected, 
will remain fallible. 
The most serious concern about Charkaoui II is that it could lead to 
increased retention of massive amounts of raw intelligence in a manner 
that will threaten privacy. CSIS could respond to Charkaoui II by 
retaining everything it collects in the vast majority of its targeted 
investigations. Although the Court was not oblivious to privacy 
concerns, its limitation of the duty to retain intelligence to investigations 
that target individuals and groups is no real limitation if over 90 per cent 
of CSIS targeted investigations still target specific groups and 
individuals as opposed to general causes and events. CSIS’s mandate 
means that it should generally target individuals and groups because the 
targeting of events and causes is less discriminating and can catch more 
legitimate dissent. Nevertheless, the targeting of individuals and groups, 
combined with the duty to retain intelligence in Charkaoui II, modern 
information technology and the expanded resources that CSIS has 
received since September 11, means that CSIS could collect and retain a 
staggering amount of intelligence. Given this, CSIS and its review bodies 
must pay close attention to restrictions on its ability to collect 
intelligence and it is unfortunate that the Supreme Court in Charkaoui II 
did not address how section 12 of the CSIS Act restricts CSIS to the 
collection of intelligence that is strictly necessary to investigate 
reasonably suspected threats to the security of Canada. 
Although Charkaoui II presents some dangers, its potential benefits 
are great. Increased retention of intelligence may play a role in helping 
CSIS work better with law enforcement. This has the potential to benefit 
both society through more effective investigations and prosecutions and 
the accused to the extent that the intelligence collected and retained by 
CSIS may assist the accused in his or her defence. CSIS like police 
forces must be reminded that it has a duty to look for and collect 
exculpatory as well as incriminatory material and it should follow the 
best thinking within intelligence agencies which recognizes the dangers 
of confirmation bias or tunnel vision in the collection and analysis of 
intelligence.  
Increased disclosure obligations have the potential to increase the 
accountability of CSIS and to ensure that its analytical product is subject 
to full adversarial challenge. As the Court repeatedly stressed in 
Charkaoui II, the retention of raw intelligence provides an important 
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opportunity for both internal and external testing of the validity of 
CSIS’s analytical conclusions. Much recent writing about intelligence by 
intelligence scholars and practitioners recognizes the fallibility of the 
analysis process and to this extent Charkaoui II should not be dismissed 
by CSIS as a decision that imposes alien lawyers’ values on the security 
intelligence world. At the same time, Charkaoui II follows in the 
tradition of other section 7 decisions that have concerned themselves 
with the possibility of miscarriages of justice that harm the innocent. 
The Court’s decision in Khadr to limit CSIS’s disclosure obligations 
to the extent to which the Charter would be applied extra-territorially in 
response to hopefully rare international human rights violations by 
Canadian officials, however, is unfortunate. Khadr limits the ability of 
disclosure to prevent intelligence errors and to provide accountability for 
CSIS’s extra-territorial work. This again reaffirms the need for review 
agencies to be given sufficient resources and powers to match the 
increased resources and powers given to intelligence and other agencies 
with national security responsibilities.  
The ability of the judicialization of intelligence to produce increased 
adjudicative fairness for persons such as Omar Khadr and Adil 
Charkaoui remains to be determined. It is significant that the Court did 
not actually order the disclosure of intelligence in either case. The 
promise of disclosure in each case will require judges to resist any 
overclaiming of secrecy by the government. In the security certificate 
context, a significant amount of the raw intelligence may only be 
disclosed to special advocates. It will be important that special advocates 
have the necessary information from detainees and others to engage in 
full and informed adversarial challenge of the raw intelligence. To this 
extent the success of Charkaoui II may depend on the success of the 
reforms initiated by Charkaoui I. 
As Jim Judd accurately predicted, the judicialization of intelligence 
is an important change and challenge for intelligence agencies. It is a 
process that is likely to continue in a post-Cold War environment where 
there is increased emphasis on counter-terrorism and the rights of those 
accused of involvement in terrorism. Given this, it will be best if CSIS 
accepts Charkaoui II and the duty to retain intelligence for possible 
disclosure, and abandons any nostalgia it may have for a world in which 
intelligence could be collected, analyzed, and destroyed so that it could 
be kept secret forever. 
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POSTSCRIPT 
On July 8, 2009 and subsequent to the completion of this paper, the 
Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) took the extraordinary 
step of publishing an unclassified report on CSIS’s involvement in the 
Omar Khadr case. This report provides independent confirmation of the 
phenomenon of the judicialization of intelligence identified by Jim Judd 
and discussed at length in this paper.  
The SIRC report found that post-September 11 terrorism investigations 
have “blurred the line between the work of intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies, and thus between intelligence and evidence”. 
CSIS information is more frequently being used in legal proceedings and 
“intelligence that is found to have been gathered in circumstances that 
violated domestic laws or international conventions will not only be 
rendered useless in the courtroom, but more importantly, will bring 
discredit to the Service”.152 In other words, CSIS needs to respect 
evidentiary standards in its terrorism investigations both to preserve its 
own reputation and to ensure that it can cooperate with law enforcement 
agencies. 
SIRC recommended that “CSIS can no longer carry out its mandate 
solely from an intelligence-gathering perspective. Political, judicial and 
legal developments post 9/11 are forcing the Service to take a less insular 
approach to its work and to consider various extra-intelligence factors”,153 
most notably the need to respect human rights and evidentiary standards. 
It called on the Minister of Public Safety to provide guidance and advice 
to CSIS to help it “undertake a fundamental re-assessment of how it 
conducts business, and to undergo a cultural shift in order to keep pace 
with the political, judicial and legal developments of recent years”.154 As 
suggested in the first part of this paper, CSIS must abandon Cold War 
policies that maximized secrecy and rejected the idea that intelligence 
would ever be disclosed in legal proceedings. 
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In completing its important report, SIRC examined all hard copy and 
electronic documents held by CSIS relating to Omar Khadr between May 
2002 and September 2005. It found no legal documentation of a legal 
opinion being obtained by CSIS before it questioned Omar Khadr for 
intelligence purposes at Guantanamo despite widespread reports of 
abuses at the military base at the time.
155
 It also found that the United 
States insisted as a condition of the visits that it record CSIS interviews 
with Omar Khadr,
156
 thus making the issue of information sharing that 
was the focus of the Supreme Court’s decision in Khadr somewhat 
academic. CSIS did, however, share its analytical reports from the Khadr 
interviews with American agencies, the RCMP and the DFAIT. CSIS 
maintains that the Khadr interviews produced undisclosed but “important 
intelligence gains” albeit ones that were “not particularly helpful in terms 
of offering new investigative leads”.157 
SIRC criticized CSIS both for failing to obtain a legal opinion before 
interviewing Omar Khadr and for failing to take into account his position 
as a youth who “been kept incommunicado and been denied access to 
legal counsel, consular representation or family members”.158 SIRC also 
interpreted the Federal Court’s injunction which prevented further 
interviews at Guantanamo
159
 and the Supreme Court’s decision requiring 
disclosure of those interviews
160
 as a “message” from the courts that 
“CSIS can no longer undertake its activities solely through the insular 
lens of intelligence-gathering, rather it must consider the wider 
environment and implications within which its work is carried out. This 
includes both the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and 
Canada’s obligations under international law.”161  
The SIRC report is a helpful and influential confirmation of the 
growing judicialization of intelligence that is supported by the 
Charkaoui II,
162
 Khadr
163
 and McNeil
164
 cases discussed in this paper. It 
goes beyond Jim Judd’s recognition of the judicialization of intelligence 
as a phenomenon that is making CSIS’s work more difficult to argue that 
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CSIS must move beyond its Cold War origins and should accept the 
increased accountability and fairness that come with the exposure of 
intelligence to disclosure in legal proceedings. 
